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The purpose of this MBA professional report is to examine and present an 
extended overview of the Total Life Cycle System Management (TLCSM) from the 
standpoint of USAF and other DoD organizations, and to make available a guide for 
implementing this concept. The report infers that TLCSM should be the foundation for 
effective management of complex weapon systems such as a multi-role fighter aircraft.  
The primary objective was to understand the methodological specifics of 
estimating Operating and Support (O&S) costs for the F-16 fighter aircraft. To facilitate 
this, the report identifies and analyzes the top cost drivers over the F-16C/D lifecycle. 
The cost drivers are a major consideration in identifying Reduction of Total Ownership 
Costs (R-TOC) opportunities. This research also explores forecasting techniques to 
estimate the Cost Per Flying Hour (CPFH). Holt’s method appears to have promise as an 
estimator of future CPFHs. 
Finally, this report concludes that TOC should be a priority consideration when 
acquiring a multi-role fighter aircraft such as F-16, and recommends that the Polish Air 
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A. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION 
The F-16 is the first American fighter to be concurrently deployed domestically 
and abroad. United States Air Force introduced F-16 into service in 1979. The total 
number of employed aircraft in the United States Air Force (USAF) as well as in the 
allied forces is currently 4,426.1 Superior aerodynamic characteristics, variety of carried 
weapon systems, modern electronic equipment and huge potential for modernization 
make the F-16 one of the most popular and desired multi-role aircraft. 
Rapidly aging post-Soviet air fleets of many Eastern European countries forced 
them to look for a new, modern solution for their air forces – multi-role aircraft. Because 
the F-16 has proven its effectiveness and reliability during many conflicts, and the fact 
that the F-16 is used in most NATO Air Forces, means that the aircraft is still a preferred 
option for potential users to modernize their air fleet. Recently, the Polish Air Force 
(PoAF) acquired 48 F-16s C/D Block 50/52+ (2004). It provides the PoAF with great 
operational capability and strengthens air power of the NATO in Europe. At the same 
time, the Romanian Air Force (RoAF) is facing an aging air fleet problem and is looking 
to acquire a new multi-role aircraft. Current military requirements and political situations 
point out that the F-16 aircraft may be the right choice for Romania. 
But a new and modern weapon system is very often accompanied by significant 
costs. Acquisition of a weapon system is only the beginning of a long life cycle. The 
Operating and Support (O&S) costs, associated with servicing a weapon system, increase 
the Total Ownership Costs (TOC). O&S costs are responsible for 78 percent of TOC of 
the modern weapon system.2 Therefore, this report provides an analysis of the O&S costs 
of the F-16 C/D Block 50/52+. The report will examine O&S costs of F-16 in the USAF. 
Based on information gathered from analysis of the United States Air Force (USAF) F-16 
                                                 
1 Global Security, “F-16 Fighting Falcon,” http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/f-16-history.htm/ 
(accessed April 27, 2006). 
2 Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Operating and Support Cost-Estimating Guide,” (Washington, DC: Cost 
Analysis Improvement Group, May 1992), 2-3, http://www.dtic.mil/pae/ (accessed March 27, 2006). 
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Life Cycle Management (LCM) and Department of Defense Acquisition System, we will 
provide recommendations for the PoAF to reduce O&S of the F-16 C/D Block 50/52+. 
Our project will try to capture the best experience in managing O&S costs in the USAF, 
and to formulate recommendations for the PoAF F-16 and RoAF. 
To create recommendations for the PoAF and the RoAF, the theoretical basis of 
O&S costs will be explained, and the basic cost drivers will be identified. Furthermore, 
the O&S costs of the F-16 C/D data from the Air Force Total Ownership Cost (AFTOC) 
database will be examined and used to build forecasting models of O&S costs. 
Poland and Romania have not had any influence on the initial phases of the LCM 
of the F-16 (Program Initiation, Concept Exploration and Definition, Concept 
Demonstration and Validation, Engineering and Manufacturing Development). 
Therefore, this report will emphasize the O&S phase of the LCM. 
B. SCOPE 
The intention of this report is to provide a general guideline for air forces which 
have acquired or are in the ongoing acquisition process of the F-16C/D. The report 
focuses on O&S costs and Total Life Cycle System Management (TLCSM) of a fighter 
aircraft in general and the F-16C/D in particular. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This report raises the questions: 
• How can O&S costs of the modern multi-role aircraft be approached to 
minimize their impact on the TOC? 
• What are the objectives and elements of the USAF F-16 C/D Life Cycle 
Management and Acquisition Process? 
• What are the structure and estimating methods of the O&S costs in the 
USAF? 
• What are best practices of reducing O&S costs in the USAF? 
• What is the AFTOC database? 
• What recommendations can be drawn for foreign users of the F-16 C/D by 
analyzing O&S costs incurred by the USAF? 
• How have O&S cost of the F-16C/D been forecasted in the USAF? 
• What recommendations may be formulated for the PoAF and RoAF? 
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D.  REPORT ORGANIZATION 
First, this MBA professional report presents background information on the F-16 
weapon system. It first considers the development of the F-16 weapon system followed 
by the main characteristics and description of the F-16. Chapter II describes the PoAF 
acquisition process and the governmental Offset Agreement signed between the Polish 
and US Governments. The last part of Chapter II presents the F-16 as a possible solution 
for the RoAF. 
Chapter III describes the acquisition process of the weapon system according to 
DoD best practices and doctrines. It also examines the TLCSM. 
Chapter IV deals with the O&S costs. It presents cost structure and the theoretical 
foundation for the O&S costs. It provides background information about R-TOC 
practices as well. 
Chapter V examines data from the AFTOC database. In the first section, the 
AFTOC database is presented, then the O&S cost of the F-16C/D are examined in 
context. The last part of Chapter V presents approaches to forecasting future O&S costs 
based on data from the AFTOC. 
Finally, this report will provide recommendations and conclusions for future 
operators of the F-16 weapon system. 
E.  METHODOLOGY 
The methodology used in this MBA report consists of the following steps: 
• A summary of the DoD acquisition rules and regulations regarding 
TLCSM and O&S costs. 
• A review of the theoretical foundations of the O&S costs based DoD 
instructions and publications, governmental and Congressional reports and 
scholarly articles. 
• A review of the literature available in the Dudley Knox Library, USAF 
magazines, and Internet resources regarding the evolution of the F-16. 
• An analysis of the F-16 C/D O&S costs data from the AFTOC database 
and development forecasting method for O&S costs. 
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II. LOCKHEED MARTIN F-16 MULTI-ROLE AIRCRAFT 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a brief history of F-16 Fighting Falcon 
development with primary focus on the F-16C/D version. In addition, the main 
characteristics of the aircraft are presented in the context of its development. Republic of 
Poland has been involved in the F-16 acquisition process since 2002, when the F-16C/D 
won the fighter competition organized by PoAF. The second part of this chapter presents 
the acquisition process for the PoAF. The RoAF will withdraw its MiG-21 Lancer 
fighters from 2008 to 2010, and is seeking the best replacement for them with a multi-
role aircraft. The F-16C/D represents a possible solution. Some implications of the future 
multi-role fighter acquisition process for RoAF are presented in the last part of the 
chapter. 
A.  F-16 FIGHTING FALCON - BRIEF HISTORY AND MAIN 
CHARACTERISTICS  
1. History 
The F-16 program traces its beginnings to the Vietnam War. During that conflict, 
American combat aircraft suffered a lack of maneuverability at transonic speeds in close 
contact with enemy aircraft. This was the stimulus for the Lightweight Fighter Program. 
The main point of that program was to combine maximum maneuverability with great 
load qualities. Lightweight Fighter candidates were provided by several American 
manufacturers in 1972. Two of them, General Dynamics and Northrop, built prototypes: 
Northrop’s twin engine YF-17, and the single engine YF-16 from General Dynamics.  
The competition was completed in 1975. Both planes proved their 
maneuverability and high performance at both transonic and slow speeds. The YF-16 was 
selected by the Air Force on January 13, 1975. The General Dynamics’ YF-16 showed 
superior performance over its Northrop rival in several aspects, such as: 
• Lower production cost (initial procurement cost and life cycle cost) 
• Lower O&S cost 
• Great results with a new fly-by-wire technology application 
• New concept of reclined seat backs 
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• Transparent Heads-up Display (HUD) and panels as a design to face high-
g maneuvers 
• High profile canopy with expanded visibility from the cockpit3 
2. Design 
A number of subsystems were adapted from other aircraft already in service (F-
15, F-111). Parts and detail assemblies were designed for simplifying the manufacturing 
process and for using low cost materials. The main purpose was to minimize purchase 
price and life cycle cost. Structural simplicity and weight reduction were taken into 
consideration as well. The light weight of the airframe was achieved without reduction of 
high-g performance capability; the F-16 Fighting Falcon can withstand up to nine g’s. 
 
 
Figure 1.   An F-16 Fighting Falcon Flies a Mission in the Skies near Iraq (From: .Air 
Force Link, U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Cherie A. Thurlby, 
http://www.af.mil/library/raptor/photos.asp?galleryID=3&page=2). 
 
                                                 
3 Global Security, “F-16 Fighting Falcon.” 
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The aerodynamic configuration is a synthesis of the high overall performance 
achieved by the configuration of the airframe: cropped delta wings, single vertical tail 
supported by a small fixed ventral fin located under the bottom of the fuselage, moving 
horizontal tail, and the fixed geometry inlet which supplies air to the single Pratt & 
Whitney F100-PW-200 turbofan engine. Good performance of the engine during the 
flight with a huge range of angle of attack is achieved by inlet location at the bottom of 
the fuselage. 
Cropped delta wings are supported by the strakes, which extend from the wings’ 
edges. That allows generation of vortexes which prevent wing stall at high angles of 
attack. The trailing edge of the wing is equipped with flaperons, which serves two 
purposes: flaps for high lift and ailerons for lateral control. The leading edge of the wing 
is equipped with automatically deployed maneuvering flaps to improve aerodynamic 
performance. 
The F-16 utilizes an advanced fly-by-wire system for its aerodynamic control 
surfaces. The pilot’s intentions are transmitted to the control surfaces by electrical signals 
that activate hydraulic systems to move aerodynamic control surfaces. That system, 
compared to the older mechanical control systems, is lighter, more precise, and simpler. 
Another novel element in the F-16 design is “relaxed static stability.” The 
traditional longitudinal stability, which is necessary for the airframe to be stable, was 
reduced to a level unacceptable for traditional airframes. It was achieved by moving the 
center of gravity (CG) to a point very near to the aerodynamic center (AC) of the plane. 
As a result the tail load and trim drag was reduced. That “uncomfortable environment” 
for the pilot is compensated for by the electronic-hydraulic augmentation system, which 
injects correction signals into the flight control system during flight.4 
The cockpit is bubble-shaped, giving the pilot a high degree of unobstructed 
forward and upward vision. Additionally, the seat-back angle of 30 degrees increases G-
force tolerance and comfort for the pilot. The traditional stick was replaced by the side 
arm controller, located on the right arm console of the cockpit. 
                                                 
4 Global Security, “F-16 Fighting Falcon.” 
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The avionic system is built of highly accurate inertial navigation system. The 
computer provides the pilot with all necessary information during the flight. It also 
enables the F-16 to carry a variety of weapons. 
3. F-16 Versions and Customers 
The F-16 is one of the most popular fighters worldwide. As the largest weapon 
systems program in the contemporary Western world, 4,426 aircraft have been built with 
production still continuing.5 F-16s, in different versions, serve in the air forces of 24 
countries: Royal Bahraini Air Force, Belgian Air Force, Chilean Air Force, Royal Danish 
Air Force, Egyptian Air Force, Indonesian Air Force, Israeli Air Force, Italian Air Force, 
Royal Jordanian Air Force, Royal Norwegian Air Force, Royal Air Force of Oman, 
Pakistani Air Force, Polish Air Force, Portuguese Air Force, Republic of China Air Force 
(Taiwan), Republic of Singapore Air Force, Republic of Korea Air Force, Royal Thai Air 
Force, Royal Netherlands Air Force, Turkish Air Force, United Arab Emirates Air Force, 
United States Armed Forces (Air Combat Command, United States Air Force in Europe, 
Pacific Air Forces, United States Navy, NASA, Air Force Reserve Command, Air 
National Guard), and Venezuelan Air Force.  
Because of the variety of customers and upgrades of the F-16 weapon system, 
many versions of the airplane entered operational service: 
• F-16 A/B Block 1/5/10/15/10OCU/20 
• F-16 C/D Block 25 
• F-16 C/D Block 30/32 
• F-16 C/D Block 40/42 
• F-16 C/D Block 50/52 
• F-16 E/F Block 60 




                                                 
5 Global Security, “F-16 Fighting Falcon.” 
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Another three versions F-16/101, F-16/79, and F-16XL were built as prototypes. 
4. Specifications  
a. Structure 
The aircraft structure consists of 80 percent aluminum alloy. Less than 
eight percent of the structure is made from steel. Composites account for three percent, 
while titanium alloy is used in only 1.5 percent. 60 percent of the structural parts are 
manufactured from sheet metal, less than two percent require chemical milling. 
Advanced technology enabled significant weight reduction. During the design phase, 
General Dynamics assumed the cost of the airframe would be USD 60 per pound. That 
reduction therefore reduced airframe cost by USD 80,000.6 
The F-16 fuselage is manufactured in three major sections: nose/cockpit, 
center, and aft. The forward section break point is aft of the cockpit. The second section 
is located forward of the vertical fin. The advanced aerodynamics and airframe gives the 
F-16 great range performance. For the F-16, 31 percent of the weight of loaded aircraft is 
fuel (for comparison, the equivalent figure for the F-14 is 28 percent). 
Wing/body blending was carried out in three dimensions. Viewed from 
both front and rear, it is almost impossible to define where the wings end and the fuselage 
begins. The wings’ leading edges also blend with the fuselage tanks. Gradually increase 
of wing thickness at its root results in the very stiff wing. The leading edge maneuvering 
flaps and trailing edge flaperons can be moved up to 35 degrees per second to fit Mach 
number and angle of attack. 
The vertical stabilizer has a multi-spar and multi-rip structure, made from 
aluminum alloy. The two ventral fins beneath the fuselage section are made from 
fiberglass. 
The intake location is unconventional. The ventral location means minimal 
airflow disturbance during the different conditions in flight. For example, at angle of 
attack 25 degrees, the airflow into the intake is at an angle of only 10 degrees. 
                                                 
6 Douglas Richardson, Modern Fighting Aircraft - F-16, (New York, NY: Arco Publishing Inc., 1983), 18. 
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To reduce the number of spare parts, some components are designed to be 
interchangeable between port and starboard. Reduction of number of spare parts and 
modular construction of the plane reduced O&S cost compared to older fighter planes in 
the USAF (Figure 2). Total O&S costs for the F-4 squadron equal USD 21,400,000 in 
1976 USD. For the F-16 squadron the O&S costs equal USD 14,600,000 in 1976 USD. 
Applications of new technology and new procedures decreased annual O&S costs by 
USD 6,500,000 in USD 1976. 
 














































































Figure 2.   Comparison of Annual O&S Costs of One USAF Squadron (From: Douglas 
Richardson, Modern Fighting Aircraft - F-16). 
 
The F-16 is equipped with the McDonnell Douglas ACES II ejection seat. 
That ejection seat was also used on the F-15 Eagle. It is rocket powered with a vectored 
thrust pitch control system. ACES II offers zero-zero performance; from an aircraft, 
which does not move, the ejection seat will move the pilot up to 100 feet (30 meters) 
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forward and rearwards up to 50 feet (15 meters). ACES II also has built-in survival 
equipment: emergency oxygen, URT-33C radio beacon, life raft, and rucksack.7 
The F-16C/D Block 50/52+, offered to Poland, is one of the latest versions 
of the plane. It has special provisions for adverse weather delivery of the McDonnell 
Douglas JDAM (Joint Direct Attack Munitions). In addition, the 50/52+ version has an 
add-on tail unit containing a synthetic aperture radar, providing guidance to 1,000 pounds 
Mk.83, 2,000 pounds Mk.84 and the 2,000 pounds BLU-109 warhead. Other features 
include passive missile warning, terrain-referenced navigation and on-board oxygen 
generating system (OBOGS). The airframe is modified to incorporate 600 US gallons 
(2,271 liters) external fuel tanks and conformal fuel tanks.8 
b. Power Plant  
Pratt & Whitney started to develop the F100 turbofan engine in 1968, 
designed originally to power the F-15. Because of the new concept of fighter aircraft with 
high thrust-to-weight ratios, the engine had to meet high stringent requirements. It pushed 
the technology of that time to the limits. 
The F-100 is an axial flow turbo fan engine with a bypass ratio 0.7:1. The 
engine has two shafts. One of them carries a three-stage fan driven by the two-stage 
turbine. The second one carries a ten-stage compressor and a two-stage turbine. Normal 
dry (without afterburner) rating is 12,420 pounds (5,634 kilograms); maximum rating is 
14,670 pounds (6,654 kilograms). Specific fuel consumption is 0.69 at normal rating and 
0.71 at maximum rating. At afterburner deployment, the engine has thrust equal to 23,830 
pounds (10,809 kilograms) with specific fuel consumption of 2.17. At that rating the 
engine burns 860 pounds (390 kilograms) of fuel per minute.9  
The General Electric F110 is similar in size to the Pratt & Whitney F100. 
The F110 has a three-stage fan leading to a nine-stage compressor, the first three stages 
of which are variable. The bypass ratio is 0.87 to 1. The annular combustion chamber is 
                                                 
7 Richardson, Modern Fighting Aircraft - F-16, 21. 
8 Carl Krittenden, “F-16C/D Block 50/52,” F-16.net, http://www.f-16.net/f-16_versions_article9.html (accessed 
April 29, 2006). 
9 Richardson, Modern Fighting Aircraft - F-16, 24. 
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designed for smokeless operation, and has 20 dual-cone fuel injectors and swirling-cup 
vaporizers. The single-stage HP turbine is designed to cope with inlet temperatures as 
high as 2500 degrees F (1370 C). Blades are individually replaceable without rotor 
disassembly. An uncooled two-stage turbine leads to a fully-modulated afterburner. 
When afterburning is demanded, fuel is injected into both the fan and core flows, which 
mix prior to combustion.10 
Pratt & Whitney developed the F100-PW-229 in the 1990s to compete 
with the GE F110 engine.  It has about 22 percent more thrust than the previous F100 
model. It is also the power plant for the F-16C/D Block 50/52+. The F100-PW-229 
engine has following main characteristics: 
• Maximum Thrust (Full Augmentation) - 29,100 pound-force (129.4 kilo 
Newton) 
• Intermediate Thrust (Non-augmented) - 17,800 pound-force (79.2 kilo 
Newton) 
• Weight (Specification Maximum) - 3,740 pounds (1,681 kilograms) 
• Length - 191 inch (4.85 meters) 
• Inlet Diameter - 34.8 inch (0.88 meters) 
• Maximum Diameter - 46.5 inch (1.18 meters) 
• Bypass Ratio - 0.36 
• Overall Pressure Ratio - 32 to 1.11 
c. Avionics 
The F-16C/D Block 50/52 version carries a comprehensive suite of 
avionics: 
• Honeywell H-423 Ring Laser Gyro Inertial Navigation System  (RLG 
INS) for rapid in-flight alignment 
• Global Positioning System (GPS) receiver 
• Data Transfer Cartridge with a large capacity (128 KB) to accommodate 
planned avionic upgrades 
                                                 
10 Joseph Baugher, “Engines for the General Dynamics F-16 Fighting Falcon,” AirToAirCombat.com, March 19, 
2000, http://www.airtoaircombat.com/background.asp?id=8&bg=40 (accessed April 29, 2006). 
11 Aeronautics Learning Laboratory for Science, Technology, and Research, “Pratt & Whitney Engines: F100-PW-
229 Turbofan Engine,” http://www.allstar.fiu.edu/AERO/P&WEngines03.html (accessed April 29, 2006). 
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• Improved Data Modem for faster data transmission 
• AN/ALR-56M advanced Radar Warning Receiver (RWR) 
• AN/ALE-47 threat adaptive countermeasure system 
• Digital terrain system data transfer cartridge 
• Night vision system compatibility 
• IFF interrogator 
• MIL-STD-1760 data bus for programming new-generation Precision 
Guided Munitions (PGMs) 
• Upgraded Programmable Display Generator 
• Horizontal Situation Display (HSD) for increased situational awareness 
and tactical flexibility on all missions.12 
 
 
Figure 3.   F-16C/D Block 50/52+ Cockpit (From: Defense Update International Online 
Defense Magazine, “Advanced F-16 Block 50/52/60,” http://www.defense-
update.com/features/du-1-04/feature-advanced-f-16.htm). 
 
The configuration of an F-16C/D Block 50/52+ cockpit (Figure 3) features 
a helmet-mounted cueing system. It allows the pilot to direct sensors or weapons to his 
                                                 
12 Krittenden, “F-16C/D Block 50/52.” 
 14
line of sight or to help him find a designated target. Heads-Up Display, several color 
multifunction displays, and advanced recording and data-transfer equipment is used to 
reduce pilot workload in every phase of the mission. The cockpit is also compatible with 
a night vision system. 
One of the key elements of the modern fighter plane is the radar system. 
The development of the F-16 as a weapon system was always related to its ability to find 
and engage targets from a distance and to detect targets even during their low altitude 
profile flights. In the 1970s and early 1980s, the primary detection sensor of the F-16A/B 
version was the Westinghouse AN/APG-66 radar, medium-PRF (Pulse Repetition 
Frequency) radar (10 to 15 Megahertz). It operates in I/J band and features a flat-plate 
array antenna. It provides the pilot with 16 operating frequencies. The pilot can chose 
among any four. Total weight of the APG-66 is 296 pounds (134 kilograms). Mean Time 
between Failure (MTBF) is 97 hours.13 
Primary air-combat mode is look-down. In that mode, the AN/APG-66 can 
detect a fighter-size plane at a range of 34.5 Nautical miles (55.6 kilometers). Four modes 
are available in air-to-air combat. In dogfight mode, the radar scans a 20 degrees x 20 
degrees field. In high-g maneuvers, it scans a 40 degrees x10 degrees pattern.14 
The version of the F-16C/D offered to Poland, Block 50/52+, has several 
additional modifications of the avionics. The IFF system was upgraded to the AN/APX-
113 advanced electronic interrogator/transponder IFF system. Also the Helmet-Mounted 
Cueing System (HMCS) was added. The new, upgraded radar system significantly 
improves performance of the F-16C/D Block 50/52+. Modifications to the AN/APG-68 
radar system and to the Northrop Grumman AN/APG-68(V)9 improved detection range 
and resolution. Application of advanced electronics enhances the radar’s ability to 
operate in a dense electronic environment and to better resist jamming. 
 
                                                 
13 Richardson, Modern Fighting Aircraft - F-16, 31. 
14 Ibid., 32. 
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The AN/APG-68(V)9 radar system improves air-to-air capabilities as well 
as air-to-ground capabilities by: 
• 30 percent increase in detecting range 
• Improvement in false alarm rate and mutual interference 
• Increase in maximum tracked targets to four  
• Improved track performance in the Track While Scan mode 
• Improved track performance in Single-Target-Track mode 
• Two-foot resolution in the new Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) mode for 
autonomous and precision weapon delivery 
• Improvement in target detection and map quality in Ground Moving 
Target Indication mode.15 
This new radar is five times faster in processing in information mode and 
it offers ten times more memory than that of the AN/APG-68 radar system.  
d. Armament 
Ordnance carried by F-16 ranges from simple unguided rockets to PGMs, 
JDAM and nuclear weapons. This section will present the main ordnance of the F-16 
with short descriptions. 
20 mm Gatling Gun System M61A1 Vulcan, a six-barrel 20 mm cannon. It 
can fire standard M50 ammunition at 6,000 rounds per minute. In some F-16 versions, 
the rate of firing is selectable. The gun is fed through linked belts of ammunition and 
driven by a hydraulic system. The ammo drum of the F-16 has a 511-round capacity. The 
M61A1 Vulcan may use the following types of ammo: 
• M55A1/A2 Target Practice Round (M220 TP Tracer Round) 
• M53 Armor-Piercing Incendiary Round 
• M56 High Explosive Incendiary Round (XM242 HEI Tracer) 
• PGU-28 ammo available in the Block50/52 version and higher.16 
AIM-9 Sidewinder, a supersonic, heat-seeking, air-to-air missile, with a 
high-explosive warhead. Sidewinder is guided by a passive infrared guidance system. 
                                                 
15 Krittenden, “F-16C/D Block 50/52.” 
16 Ibid. 
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Unit cost ranges from USD 56,000 to USD 84,000. The missile is built of an infrared 
homing guidance section, an active optical target detector, a high explosive warhead and 
a rocket motor. It can accelerate from 0 to 2.5 Mach in 2.2 seconds. Early models of the 
Sidewinder were considered to have 70 percent single shot kill probability in ideal 
conditions. The following Sidewinder versions are available for F-16: AIM-9, AIM-9A, 
AIM-9B, AIM-9C, AIM-9D, AIM-9E, AIM-9E2, AIM-9G/H, AIM-9J, AIM-9J-1, AIM-
9J-3, AIM-9N, Rb 24, AIM-9L/M, AIM-9M-7, Rb 74, AIM-9P, AIM-9P-1, AIM-9P-2, 
AIM-9P-3, AIM-9P-4, AIM-9Q, AIM-9R, AIM-9S, AIM-9X.17 
AIM-120 AMRAAM. The Advanced Medium Range Air to Air Missile is a 
high-supersonic, day/night/all weather Beyond Visual Range (BVR) weapon. It has fire-
and-forget air-to-air capability. It consists of a high-explosive warhead, an active radar 
homing sensor for the final stages of flight, and a rocket motor.  It is launched with 
inertial mid-course guidance without the need for the fighter to keep the target 
illuminated. Its capabilities include look-down, shoot-down, multiple launches against 
multiple targets, and intercepts at very short range in dogfight situations. The unit cost of 
the AIM-120 is USD 386,000. There are four versions of the AMRAAM: AIM-120A, 
AIM-120B, Rb-99, AIM-120C. It is capable to of flying with speeds up to 4 Mach, and it 
can engage targets 30+ Nautical miles (48+kilometers).18 
AGM-65 Maverick, a tactical, air-to-surface, infra-red or electro-optically 
guided missile. The Maverick is primarily employed in Close Air Support missions, but it 
is equally effective in anti-armor, SEAD and interdiction roles. Unit costs vary due to the 
many versions of the AGM-65 (e.g., USD 48,000 for the A-model and USD 269,000 for 
the G-model).19 During the history of conflicts, Maverick has demonstrated an 86 percent 
hit rate in combat. Average miss distance during tests was 3 feet (0.91 meters).20 The 
AIM-65 is available in 7 variants: A, B, C, D, E, F, G.  
                                                 
17 Krittenden, “F-16C/D Block 50/52.” 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Richardson, Modern Fighting Aircraft - F-16, 42. 
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Other Armament. The F-16 can also carry the JDAM, guided by a GPS 
system, and dropped up to 15 NM standoff distance. To ensure high performance in flight 
and attack, the F-16 can carry navigation and targeting pods: AN/AAQ-13 and AN/AAQ-
14 LANTIRN. The LANTIRN system consists of two pods, which allows the plane to fly 
in all weather conditions, day and night. It provides the crew with a Terrain-Following 
Radar (TFR), a Forward-Looking Infra-Red (FLIR), targeting information for the on-
board fire control system, and target laser illumination. The following armament may be 
also carried by the F-16: 
• Durandal anti-runway weapon 
• Cluster munitions 
• Penguin MK-3 anti-ship missile 
• Nuclear bombs 
• ALQ-131 pod 
• LAU rocket launcher 
• Paveway laser guided bombs 
• Mk82 500 pounds (227 kilograms) 
• Mk83 1000 pounds (454 kilograms) 
• Mk84 2000 pounds (907 kilograms) 
• Mk117 750 pounds (340 kilograms) 
• Mk82 Snakeye  
• AGM-78 anti-radar missile 
• AGM-88 HARM 
• AGM-45 Shrike21 
5. Summary 
The F-16 is one of the most widely deployed fighter planes. There are currently 
4,426 F-16s in service throughout the world. Despite its 1970s origins, there are still 
opportunities to modernize it. Since the 1970s, the only common part of the many 
versions is its famous name – “Viper.” Engines, avionics, control systems and ordnance 
have been developed and modified to meet the demands of its many users. International 
                                                 
21 Richardson, Modern Fighting Aircraft - F-16, 46. 
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air forces still want to acquire F-16s and put them in service as a major combat weapon 
system. Even though there are available airframes ranked as 4.5th and 5th generation 
fighters on the military market, the F-16 – a 4th generation fighter - still meets the 
requirement of the contemporary battlefield.  
In the next part of this chapter, we will discuss the F-16 acquisition process in 
Poland. We will point out main turning points in that process, and we will show how a 
modern weapon system may affect the country’s economy. We will also discuss the F-16 
as a possible solution for the Romanian Air Force – which has yet to decide about its 
future combat aircraft. 
B. ACQUISITION OF F-16 C/D BLOCK 50/52+ BY POLISH AIR FORCE 
1. Polish Decision  
The contract for the acquisition of 48 F-16C/D Block50/52+ traces its beginning 
to 1992. Then, the Commander of the Polish Air Force Gen. Jerzy Gotowala suggested 
during an official visit in the United States of America that the Polish Air Force consider 
leasing 12 fighter planes from the USAF (F-16C or F-18).  The F-18 option was declined 
in later considerations due to the high cost of acquisition. That idea was the beginning of 
the acquisition process of a new multi-role fighter aircraft. On June 22, 2001, the Polish 
Government approved the modernization plan for the Polish armed forces. One of the 
main points of that plan was to acquire 48 new fighter planes. The offset program, 
explained in greater detail below, was considered to be one of the most important 
elements of the acquisition process. As it turned out, the size of the offset offered was the 
decisive element in the Polish decision. 
On July 8, 2001, the specific requirements of the new fighter planes for the Polish 
Air Forces were sent to the French, American, British, and Swedish Embassies. With this 





Requirements were specified in 266 pages, and they defined Polish expectations 
regarding: 
• Characteristics of the plane 
• Possible financial options 
• Offset program.22 
On November 12, 2002, the proposed offers from the contractors were submitted. 
Evaluation of propositions was then carried out by Polish authorities and the Acquisition 
and Offset Committee. The whole process took 657 days with 93 specialists engaged.23 
2. Evaluation Standards and Requirements for the Multi-Role Aircraft 
Proposals  
The evaluation standards consisted of four elements: price of aircraft, combat and 
operational capabilities of the aircraft, main characteristics and engineering specifications 
of the airplane (MC&ER), and the offset program.  
Evaluation Standards and Requirements Structure used by Polish Ministry of 
Economy and Offset Program Committee during multi-role aircraft selection process for 
the Polish Air Force are presented in Figure 4. The structure consisted of: Price 
(maximum 45 points), Combat Requirements (maximum 20 points), Main Characteristics 
and Engineering Requirements (maximum 15 points) and Offset Program (maximum 15 
points). 
Combat and operational capabilities had to meet Polish Air Force and Defense 
Policy needs. The PoAF had an aging fleet problem since the 1980s. Soviet aircraft 
delivery ended just after 1989, when Polish society overthrew the communist regime. The 
existing aircraft fleet did not allow the PoAF to accomplish defense tasks at modern 
warfare levels. 
 
                                                 
22 Zdzislaw Wydra, ”Zwyciężyl F-16,” [in Polish] Wiraże, no. 2 (2003), 
http://www.czasopismawlop.mil.pl/wiraze/w_numerzew/archiwumw/2-2003/zwyc.htm (accessed March 28, 2006). 
23 Ibid. 
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Evaluation Standards and Requirements 










Figure 4.   Evaluation Standards and Requirements Structure (From: Zdzislaw Wydra, 
“Zwyciężyl F-16,” [in Polish] Wiraże, no. 2, (2003)).  
 
There were 53 Combat and operational requirements. The new planes for Poland 
had to have air refueling capability, and carry a large amount of various armaments. One 
requirement considered armament compatibility with NATO standards and be able to 
operate with NATO partners. 
In addition, the engineering and technical specifications of the plane played a 
major role during the selection process. Polish authorities evaluated 430 elements, 
including the following aspects: speed, maneuverability, take-off and landing distance, 
case of maintenance, durability, and O&S cost profile. In addition, the Polish specialists 
evaluated the airframe, hydraulic system, electrical system, fuel system, and engine 
system. The armament configuration, weapons carriages, cockpit configuration, avionics 
systems, and life support systems were also evaluated. Survivability of the aircraft on the 
modern battlefield, training, flying and maintenance personnel, possibility of acquiring 
simulators to train personnel, spare parts procurement, and technical support from the 
contractor also constituted important elements in the selection process.24 
 
 
                                                 
24 Wydra, ”Zwyciężyl F-16.” 
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3. Offset Program 
Every country pays special attention to the development of its national defense 
sector, including research activity, because of the great importance of defense for each 
country. However, national industry is not always able to meet requirements of national 
defense policy. Similarly to other countries, the Polish defense industry must support its 
efforts from foreign resources, and must import armaments. In this case an offset is a 
kind of obligatory cooperation between national contractors and foreign suppliers. 
Offsets are compensation instruments required when a contract for supplying armaments 
is awarded to a foreign contractor. 
Offsets mean compensation for the country spending money on purchases in the 
public sector. This is one method for promoting economic growth.25 
All offset agreements between the Polish government and foreign companies are 
based on Polish law (see offset process structure in Figure 5). The main law concerning 
offset is the Act on Offset Agreements of September 10, 1999, for compensation 
agreements concluded to cover defense and security contracts. 
The Act sets forth the rules as well as the rights and liabilities for parties making 
an offset agreement related to armament and weapon system delivery into the Republic of 
Poland for the purposes of defense and security of State.26 The Act also establishes 
general provisions, rules of execution of the offset agreement, the composition and tasks 
for the Committee for the Offset Agreements as well as the supervision of the 
performance of the offset agreements. 
                                                 
25 Republic of Poland, Ministry of Economy, “Offset in Poland,” 
http://www.mgip.gov.pl/English/ECONOMY/Offset+Programmes/Basic+information/ (accessed April 28, 2006). 
26 Republic of Poland, Ministry of Economy, “Act of 10 September 1999, on certain compensation agreements 
concluded in connection with contracts for deliveries for the needs of defense and security,” 
http://www.mgip.gov.pl/English/ECONOMY/Offset+Programmes/Basic+information/ (accessed April 28, 2006). 
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Figure 5.   Offset Procedure in the Republic of Poland. 
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The main objectives of the offset programs in Poland are: 
• Development of Polish industry 
• Access to the new exports market  
• Increasing current export potential 
• Transfer of new technologies 
• Development of research work 
• Development of Polish universities and R&D centers 
• Creation of new jobs in the Republic of Poland.27 
Because of the factors listed above, the Polish Government paid great attention to 
the offset program incorporated in the new multi-role aircraft contractors’ offers. The size 
of the possible contract (USD 3.5 billion) also underlined the significance of the Offset 
Program. Additionally, one of the main principles of the offset agreement in Polish Law 
states: “The total value shall not be lower than the equivalent of the supply contract.”28 
That means that the offset could be as high as USD 7 billion. 
The combat, operational and engineering specifications of all the offers were 
closed to one another. That is why the points (maximum 15) for the offset program had 
been considered to be crucial. Two of the three offset offers exceeded 100 percent of the 
contract value (Lockheed Martin and Saab-BAE Systems). The French proposal did not 
reach 100 percent; after verification and offset multipliers application it turned out the 
French proposal was equal to 60 percent of the total contract value.29 
According the Polish Offset Law, offset multipliers were used to evaluate the 
attractiveness of the offset program proposals. It helps to draw foreign contractors’ 
attention to Poland’s offset needs and to state which of them are of special significance 
for the economy: 
Multiplier  Value Nominal  ValueOffset ×=  
                                                 
27 Republic of Poland, Ministry of Economy, “Offset in Poland.” 
28 Ibid. 
29 Zdzislaw Wydra, ”F-16 Oferta Offsetowa,” [in Polish] Wiraże, no. 3 (2003), 
http://www.czasopismawlop.mil.pl/wiraze/w_numerzew/archiwumw/3-2003/f16o.htm (accessed March 28, 2006). 
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There are different types of the multipliers and they depend on the nature of the 
offset. Polish offset law distinguishes two offsets: direct and indirect. A direct offset is an 
offset commitment performed by defense industry companies (listed in the relevant 
regulation), whose objectives are production, repairs, servicing, research and 
development and trading in armaments. Indirect offsets concern other companies 
registered in Poland.30 Multipliers for direct and indirect offset are presented in Appendix 
A, Appendix B, and Appendix C. 
The amount of money transferred to the Polish economy, as an effect of proposed 
offset programs for the Multi-Role Aircraft Acquisition before and after offset multiplier 
application, is presented in Figure 6. 
 
































with Offset Multipliers 
 
Figure 6.   Total Offset Value Depends on Applied Multipliers. In the two cases (U.S. 
and U.K.-Sweden) total offset value was larger than contract value.  (From: 
Zdzislaw Wydra,” F-16 Oferta Offsetowa,” [in Polish] Wiraże, no. 3 
(2003)). 
 
                                                 
30 Republic of Poland, Ministry of Economy, “Offset in Poland.” 
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The United States’ offer was originally estimated to be USD 9.8 billion. After the 
verification process, the American offer was still the biggest and equal to USD 6.3 
billion. The offset proposal consisted of 104 commitments. The United States’ offer 
claimed to meet the offset commitments by investing in 55 programs in the defense sector 
(direct offset) and in 49 programs in the other branches of Polish economy (indirect 
offset).31 The complete list of the United States offset commitments is attached in the 
Appendix D and Appendix E.  
The total offset value, after an offset multiplier application, is equal today to USD 
12,547 million with its nominal value of USD 7,751 million.32 This contributes 
significantly to the Polish economy. As models, offset programs were boosters for the 
economy in Brazil (Embraer airline transport), for the Finnish economy (the electronic 
and wood industries), for Spain (military forces and airline industry), and for Israel 
(electronics sector). The Polish offset program has following structure: 
• Export and purchase – 70% 
• Investment in economy – 20% 
• Technology transfer – 10%.33 
There is one more very important issue about the “Contract of the Century” (as 
referenced in Polish and European newspapers). The United States government decided 
to give Poland a loan for that purchase. Poland will pay the USD 3.5 billion after 2010. 
Until that time the only financial obligation to the United States will be interest.  Poland 




                                                 
31 Wydra, ”F-16 Oferta Offsetowa.” 
32 Republic of Poland, Ministry of Economy, “The List of Lockheed Martin’s Offset Commitments,” 
http://www.mgip.gov.pl/NR/rdonlyres/D388B4F0-F028-4D79-A15F-B5EFD29BDC8F/0/zestawienie_zbiorcze.doc/ 
(accessed March 30, 2006). 
33 wprost Online, “Miliardy Dolarów na Skrzydlach F-16,” [in Polish] (2003), http://www.wprost.pl/ar/?O=43338/ 
(accessed March 30, 2006). 
34 Ibid. 
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To stress the significance and size of the offset commitments of the United States, 
it should be compared with the rest of the major offset programs in Poland (Figure 7 and 
Appendix F). The rest of the total offset programs in Poland equal USD 1.718 billion (1 
March 2006).35 The US offset commitment is equal to USD 6.028 billion nominal 
value.36  
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Figure 7.   Offset Commitment in Poland as of March 1, 2006 (From: Republic of 
Poland, Ministry of Economy, “List of Offset Agreements in Poland (as of 
January 1, 2005)” [in Polish]). 
 
The Polish F-16C/D Block50/52+ will be in service in October 2006 (the first 5 
planes). Delivery is scheduled to end in 2008. After that time, three squadrons of F-16s 
from the Polish Air Force should achieve combat readiness for world wide deployment in 
                                                 
35 Republic of Poland, Ministry of Economy, “List of offset agreements in Poland (as of 1 January 2005)” [in 
Polish], http://www.mgip.gov.pl/NR/rdonlyres/3627A141-DBD7-4010-950A-
6A8C08AA5ABA/17858/offset_umowy_060302.pdf/ (accessed March 30, 2006). 
36 The amount of offset commitment was transferred from the EURO to US Dollars using the rate of exchange €1 = 
$1.1935. Rate of exchange from March 1, 2006 from the National Bank of Poland, http://www.nbp.pl/ (accessed March 
30, 2006). 
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NATO missions. Polish F-16C/D Block50/52+ will be the most advanced version among 
F-16 aircraft in NATO forces. This is important, because Polish F-16s are meant to stay 
in service for up to 30 years. In addition, they have huge potential to be modernized. 
Selection of the F-16 by the Polish government is also a selection of a course of policy. 
Given the key ally role for the United States, Poland will also have the opportunity to be 
one of the first countries for consideration for the new generation fighter F-35. There is a 
good chance that Romania will follow a similar strategy. 
C. ROMANIA – POTENTIAL F-16 CUSTOMER 
Poland and Romania share common values and have similar characteristics 
regarding their positions in Central Europe and South East Europe (respectively) and 
their relations with the United States. First, Poland is the largest and most important 
country in Central Europe, while Romania benefits from a key geo-strategic position in 
the South-Eastern part of the continent. Second, both countries are part of the “New 
Europe” as State Secretary Rumsfeld called them, and enjoy special partnerships with the 
United States.   
Regarding its security, Romania has largely followed Poland’s path. Admittedly, 
Romania was the first country to sign the Partnership for Peace Program which, in the 
beginning, was thought to be the anteroom for NATO accession. Poland became a NATO 
member in 1999 after the Washington summit. Five years later, in 2004, Romania joined 
the North-Atlantic club. A similar pattern was followed by Poland and Romania for 
European Union membership.  
NATO membership was not only a culmination, but also a milestone along the 
way toward military restructuring. Given the security guarantees gained once Romania 
became a full member of the NATO Alliance, the number of fighting squadrons of the 
Romanian Air Force was diminished by two squadrons. Despite programs for upgrading 
the MiG-29, Romania decided to withdraw the MiG-29 from service and focus on the 
MiG-21 Lancer (the modernized version of the MiG-21M/MF) as its prime combat 




the Department of Armament, who stated that ”after a deep analysis, the air force 
considered that the financial investment in the overhaul and upgrading [of the MiG-29] 
too big an effort for a small number of aircraft.”37  
The MiG-21 upgrading program has been a major element in the regeneration of 
the RoAF and the Romanian aerospace industry following the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union and Warsaw Pact. It has allowed the RoAF to jump a generation of combat 
aircraft. Despite an over-30 year-old airframe, the MiG-21 Lancer is a fighter equipped 
with current sensors, avionics technology and modern weaponry. It has been modernized 
in two versions: the Lancer-A ground-attack version and the Lancer-C air-superiority 
version.38 In addition, 14 MiG-21 UM two-seaters were modernized to the Lancer-B 
standard for training purposes. 
The MiG-21 Lancer was accepted as an interoperable aircraft that may participate 
in missions alongside the NATO Air Forces. Starting in 2004, MiG-21 Lancer pilots are 
in fact executing air sovereignty missions over Romanian airspace. Based on this 
experience, NATO has accepted Romania’s proposal to take on responsibility of the air 
policing over the Baltic States as a part of regular NATO rotations in the region.  
In current circumstances, the RoAF has to execute high-complexity and high-risk 
missions which require, as a necessity, a modern, multi-role fighting aircraft, belonging 
to the fourth or fifth generation. Among requirements, the following have priority: 
maximum efficacy in the battlespace environment, flexibility in executing missions with 
the capability to change assignment during mission, larger number of take-offs per time 
period, reduced times of flight recovery capacity, low operations and maintenance costs, 
higher flight autonomy, open system design to allow further upgrading, and excellent 
flight and maneuvering capabilities. 
The MiG-21 will be in service until they run out of technical resources. Until 
2010, 50 percent of them will be unsupportable, while the rest of them will remain in 
                                                 
37 Michael J. Gething, “Lancer upgrade leads Romania’s leap into the 21st Century,” Jane’s International Defence 
Review 036, no. 006 (2003). 
38 For full details, see Jane's Defence Systems Modernisation IX, no.7, (1996).  
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service for another four years. Overall, the MiG-21 Lancer program has not been 
tremendously successful. The MiG-21 remains a useful aircraft for some missions, and its 
low-radar cross section and agility potentially make it a difficult opponent even for front-
line fighters. However, its small, aging airframe and limited radar and avionics upgrade 
options have been a drag on modernization efforts. Consequently, Romania is interested 
in replacing the MiG-21 Lancer fleet with new aircraft. Therefore, an evaluation of 
available alternatives is being carried out. 
During 2005, the following companies briefed the Romanian Air Force HQ about 
their offers of multi-role aircraft: Boeing with the F/A-18, a joint venture with Elbit 
Systems, Lockheed Martin with the F-16, and Gripen International with the JAS 39 
Gripen. Given Romania’s future membership in the European Union, the Eurofighter 
might also become a potential competitor. 
According to Jane’s, in February 2006, the National Supreme Defense Council 
approved the “conception on major procurement programs for Romanian Armed Forces 
2006-2025” document. Romania's NATO status requires a fourth-generation, multi-role 
fighter aircraft. To carry out domestic missions and meet NATO commitments, the RoAF 
needs 48 multi-role fighters to be operational by 2010.39 
At the end of October 2005, the Israeli media announced that Romania signed a 
new contract with Elbit Systems, worth 150 million dollars, to buy F-16A and F-16B jet-
fighters. Other sources reported an even higher price, some 400 million dollars. This 
would also include additional costs such as Mid Life Upgrade (MLU), also known as 
Falcon Up (which is about 3 million dollars per aircraft), operating and maintenance 
costs, the cost for training pilots and technicians, and the new armament systems. 
However, Romanian authorities denied that a decision has been made. As Defense 
Minister Atanasiu emphasized, for the time being Romania is evaluating and researching  
 
 
                                                 
39 Radu Tudor, “Romania opens talks on fighter procurement,” Jane’s International Defence Review 39, no. 003 
(2006). 
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the offers, but no firm decision has been made regarding the type of the aircraft to be 
purchased.40 In addition, he mentioned that purchasing new aircraft are preferable to used 
ones: 
“Our aspiration, which coincides with the desire of the Romanian Armed Forces, 
is to purchase new multi-role aircraft. We do not know if the budget, the Finance 
Minister and the government would agree with our request, or we would get much 
limited funding and we would be forced to purchase second-hand aircraft.”41 
A decision regarding the acquisition of a multi-role aircraft is scheduled to be 
made by the end of 2006, meaning that in 2007 negotiations would start with aircraft 
entering the RoAF service in 2010, and all units equipped and fully operational by 2014.  
The final decision about the purchase of fighter aircraft will influence the 
structure and effectiveness of the RoAF for the next 20 years. Irrespective of the aircraft 
chosen, the RoAF would pay not only for the acquisition price, but also for operating and 
support costs.  
In the wake of the Cold War, defense budgets have continually decreased. This 
results in a general decrease of numbers of military aircraft purchased since early 1990s, 
associated with dramatic increase in aircraft acquisition cost. Taking into account the 
above-mentioned, financial aspects have outweighed military reasoning in choosing 
among alternatives. Also, cost is clearly a significant driver when choosing an acquisition 
strategy.  
Financial acquisition strategy includes four categories: budget financing, fund 
financing, debt financing, and leasing. During the Cold War, budget financing was the 
preferred method.  However, “the Navy has a long history of leasing ships to augment 
military capability in times of war.”42 An extended debate was generated by the USAF  
 
                                                 
40 Arieh Egozi, “Israel, Romania seal F-16 sale deal,” Jane’s International Defence Review 38, no. 010 (2005). 
41 Teodor Atanasiu, cited by Mihai Diac, “Bucharest would like to spend millions of dollars on fighter aircraft,” [in 
Romanian] (Bucharest: Gandul, March 10, 2006). 
42 Joseph G. San Miguel, John K. Shank and Donald E. Summers, “Navy Acquisition via Leasing: Policy, Politics, 
and Polemics with the Maritime Prepositioned Ships,” NPS Acquisition Research, April 2005, 3. 
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proposal to lease new refueling tankers from Boeing. The Hungarian experience, which 
includes a 12-year lease of 14 JAS-39 Gripen multi-role fighters, has been more 
successful.  
In the Hungarian case43 as well as in the Polish case, the offset agreement was a 
key element in the acquisition process. A major part of the offset agreement is the 
participation of the aeronautical industry along with the contractor the modernization 
process. 
Romania has a long history of producing high quality aircraft and helicopters. 
Numerous links with Western Europe’s industries have been established since 1970s. 
During the 1990s, Romanian aeronautical industries started an extended collaboration 
with the Israeli defense industry. The modernization process of MiG-21 is only one of 
numerous examples. However, the current defense trade sector is still struggling with its 
legacy of state control, which includes inefficient production methods and obsolete 
management practices. Therefore, the involvement of Romanian industry in the 
procurement and ownership of the multi-role aircraft will be an essential element in the 
decision-making.  
In conclusion, the acquisition process of the multi-role aircraft for RoAF must 
begin soon. As part of that process, the experience of Poland, as well as the Hungarian 
case will be analyzed by the decision-makers, and lessons learned will be applied. 
Undoubtedly some aspects of the acquisition process, as accomplished by DoD, would 
constitute a model for Romania’s approach. Particularly important in this respect is the 
estimation of operatings and support costs. In the following chapters, the acquisition 
process in DoD will be addressed, and based on the above, it is expected that Romania 
will decide on the most appropriate and affordable path to be followed. 
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III. DOD’S APPROACH TO WEAPON SYSTEM MANAGEMENT 
The last fifteen years have brought significant changes to the structure and task of 
the U.S. Military Forces. Those changes were caused by shifting political and military 
requirements in the post Cold War Era. In addition, the development of modern 
technology has created a new battlefield environment. Modern technology is enormously 
expensive and needs large appropriations allocated from shrinking budgets. Almost every 
country has problems with fulfilling the needs of its military forces. In order to meet the 
requirements of the U.S. Military Forces in the 21st Century, the DoD fundamentally 
reengineered the way it does business, and a new Defense Acquisition System was 
established. “The Defense Acquisition System is the management process by which the 
DoD provides effective, affordable, and timely systems to the users.”44  
The effectiveness of modern weapon systems, such as the F-16 Multi-Role 
Aircraft, and their affordability, as well as the time needed to field them are determined 
by the way they are acquired. Moreover, the Total Ownership Cost (TOC) will also be 
affected by decisions during the acquisitions phases.  In order to better understand the 
basics of the acquisition process and its effect on ownership costs, we present the new 
Defense Acquisition System developed by the DoD in this chapter. We also elaborate 
each phase of the acquisition process of the modern weapon system. Next, we 
concentrate on the Total Life Cycle Management System (TLCMS). TLCMS and 
acquisition system have direct impacts on TOC, particularly on operating and support 
costs. 
The Defense Acquisition System was established to manage investment in 
modern technologies, programs and product support necessary to meet the requirements 
of the National Security Strategy and to support the U.S. Armed Forces. The national 
investment in technologies, conducted within the Defense Acquisition System, must  
 
                                                 
44 Department of Defense, “DoD Directive no. 5000.1 – The Defense Acquisition System,” (Washington, D.C.: 
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Technology, and Logistics, 2003), para. 3.1, 
http://hfetag.dtic.mil/docs/DoD_5000-1.doc (accessed April 27, 2006). 
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support not only today’s armed forces but also future armed forces. This provides U.S. 
military forces with a unique opportunity to be the leading armed forces all over the 
world. 
The primary objective of the Defense Acquisition System is to provide users with 
quality products plus measurable improvements to mission capability and operational 
support. According to the DoDD 5000.1, the following policies should govern the 
Defense Acquisition System: 
• Flexibility – there is no one way to satisfy users and accomplish objectives 
of the Defense Acquisition System. Milestone Decision Authorities 
(MDAs) and Program Managers (PMs) should tailor the program 
strategies and oversight to meet the particular condition of the program. 
• Responsiveness – advanced technologies should be integrated with 
production and they should enter service in the shortest possible time. 
Evolutionary acquisition strategy is the preferred approach to satisfy 
operational needs. 
• Innovation – acquisition professionals should continuously develop and 
implement strategies to improve the Defense Acquisition System. The 
main objective of the innovation capabilities of the acquisition system 
should be to reduce cycle time, cost and encourage teamwork. 
• Discipline – every PM should establish program objectives with optimum 
cost, schedule and performance parameters that describe the program over 
its life cycle. 
• Streamlined and Effective Management – responsibility for system 
acquisition should be decentralized to the maximum extent possible.  
Responsible individuals should be provided45 by the MDA with sufficient 
authority to accomplish the Defense Acquisition System’s objectives.    
A. PROCESS OF ACQUISITION BASED ON THE DOD SYSTEM LIFE-
CYCLE PHASES 
The DoD acquisition process is extremely complex, involving hundreds of 
thousands of people and many years of engagement. The process also involves 
assimilation of information and management within many areas, often overlapping one 
another, which are difficult to predict and measure.  The main objective of that structure 
is, however, to ensure the best possible expenditure of public funds. To accomplish that 
                                                 
45 DoD, “DoD Directive 5000.1,” para. 3 – “Policy.”   
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task, DoD has developed its acquisition system over many years of experience,. The 
system has also evolved within boundaries where many potentially competing interests 
are balanced with many resource constraints.  
The management framework for the Defense System Acquisition is commonly 
referred to as the acquisition life cycle. The new DoDI 5000.2 presents the acquisition 
system and its elements. The new framework for the acquisition system is called the 
“New 5000 Model” (Figure 8).46  The main objective of the “New 5000 Model” is to 
improve performance and lower costs. To meet that objective, the model considers 
following key focus areas: 
• Delivery of advanced technology to warfighters faster by 
• Rapid acquisition with demonstrated technology 
• Full system demonstration before commitment to production 
• Reducing Total Ownership Cost and improving affordability 
• Costs as requirement that drives design, procurement, and support  
• Increased competition 
• Deploying interoperable and supportable systems 
• Interoperability presented before production phase 
• Integration of logistic and acquisition 
• Improvement of software management 
                                                 
46 Charles B. Cochrane, “Introduction to Defense Acquisition Management,” 6th ed., (Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense 
Acquisition University Press, 2003), 49, http://www.dau.mil/pubs/gdbks/idam.asp (accessed April 10, 2006). 
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Figure 8.   The New 5000 Model of the DoD Systems Acquisition Process (From: DoD 
Template for Application of TLCSM and PBL in the Weapon System Life 
Cycle, http://www.acq.osd.mil/log/lpp/tlcm/TLCSMGuidanceTemplate.pdf). 
 
According to the New 5000 Model, technology opportunities and missions must 
be presented before entering the acquisition process. In the new model multiple systems 
acquisition strategies are possible, which the model encourages. The preferred approach 
is called evolutionary acquisition, based on the assumption that time-phased requirements 
will improve acquisition system performance. The success of this strategy depends on a 
consistent definition of operational capability requirements coupled with maturation of 
technologies. Evolutionary acquisition strategy also demands a robust system engineering 
approach focused on adding capabilities in future increments.47 
Development of technology is separated from systems integration. As a result, 
technology is proved before beginning system-level work at Milestone B. The next 
important element of the new model is the requirement of meeting “entrance criteria” 
before moving to the next phase. It ensures the readiness of the system to be moved to the 
next phase of development without any delay. Moreover, it reduces the costs. In the New 
5000 Model, the operation, support, and disposal phases have become integrated parts of 
the acquisition process. Thus, the process encompasses the entire system life cycle.   
                                                 
47 United States Air Force, “Air Force Instruction 63-101 - Operations of Capabilities Based Acquisition System,” 
(Washington DC: Secretary of Air Force, 2005), para. 1.4, http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/pubfiles/af/63/afi63-
101/afi63-101.pdf (accessed April 14, 2006). 
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1. Pre-Acquisition 
a. Concept Refinement Phase and Milestone A 
The pre-acquisition phase is composed of two elements: concept 
refinements and technology development.  
The Concept Refinement Phase begins when the Concept Decision is 
approved by the Milestone A Decision Authority (MDA) (Figure 9 presents the 
framework of the Concept Refinements Phase prior to Milestone A). During that phase, 
the Technology Development Strategy (TDS) is developed. The main objective of the 
TDS is to set the foundations for the next phase – Technology Development. The MDA 
determines who will prepare the TDS. 
  
 
Figure 9.   Integration of Acquisition, T&E and Requirements Events Prior to 
Milestone A (From: USAF, “Air Force Instruction 63-101,” (2005)). 
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To support the Concept Refinement Phase, an Analysis of the Alternatives 
(AoA) is conducted. An AoA is an analytical comparison of the operational effectiveness 
and costs of proposed material solutions to shortfalls in operational capabilities, also 
called mission needs (Appendix G). The AoA presents the rationale for the preferred 
solutions to the mission needs.48  
In order to achieve the best possible solutions, the Concept Refinement 
Phase emphasizes innovations and competitions. It also emphasizes existing commercial 
solutions. They are drawn from diverse specialties and from large and small businesses 
alike. The Concept Refinement Phase ends when the MDA approves the solution 
supported by the AoA and TBS, which form the guidelines for the next Phase – 
Technology Development.  
b. Technology Development Phase 
The Technology Development Phase should reduce technology risk 
(Figure 10 presents the Framework of the Technology Development Phase). It is also 
designed to determine suitable technologies which may be incorporated into the new 
weapon system. During that phase close cooperation of the following elements is 
required: operators, testers, and system development stakeholders. Elements which were 
developed in the Concept Refinement Phase, require updates during that phase as well.49   
The Technology Development Phase begins after the Milestone A 
decision point, when the Milestone Decision Authority approves the TDS. The TDS, 
which was created in the prior phase, is the map for technology development during this 
phase.  However, the favorable decision regarding TDS does not necessary mean that a 
new acquisition program has been initiated. During that phase a series of demonstrations 
of the new system may also be conducted to help the users and developers agree on 
appropriate technology to accomplish the acquisition program goals. 
                                                 
48 USAF, “AFI 63-101,” para. 4.3.3. 
49 USAF, “AFI 63-101,” para. 5.2. 
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Figure 10.   Integration of Acquisition, T&E, and Requirement Events Prior to Milestone 
B (From: USAF, “Air Force Instruction 63-101,” (2005)). 
 
“The project is ready to leave that phase when the technology for an affordable 
increment of a militarily useful capability has been demonstrated in a relevant 
environment.”50 
2. Systems Acquisition 
a. Milestone B and System Development and Demonstration Phase 
The objectives of the System and Development Demonstration phase are: 
• Develop a system or increment of capability 
• Reduce integration and manufacturing risk 
• Ensure operational capability 
• Implement human system integration 
                                                 
50 Cochrane, ”Introduction to Defense Acquisition Management,” 53. 
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• Ensure affordability and protection of critical program information using 
appropriate techniques (anti-tamper measures) 
• Demonstrate system integration, interoperability, safety and utility.51 
The decision point for the System Development and Demonstration phase 
is Milestone B, which is the acquisition program initiation. The decision is made by the 
Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) – a designated individual with overall 
responsibility for the program. The MDA has authority to approve entry into the next 
phase of the acquisition process. The MDA is also responsible for costs, scheduling and 
performance reporting to the higher authority (including Congressional reporting). 
 
 
Figure 11.   Integration of Acquisition, T&E, and Requirements Events Prior to 
Milestone C (From: USAF, “Air Force Instruction 63-101,” (2005)). 
 
                                                 
51 Department of Defense, “Department of Defense Instruction 5000.2 - Operation of the Defense Acquisition 
System,” (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Technology, and Logistics, 
2003), para. 3.7.1.1., http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf2/i50002p.pdf (accessed April 14, 2006). 
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Before making any decision in the Milestone B decision point, the MDA 
confirms that technology is sufficiently mature for system-level development. The MDA 
also has responsibility to confirm that appropriate documents from the Joint Capabilities 
Integration and Development Systems (JCIDS) have been approved.52 Additionally, the 
MDA ensures that funds are in the budget. 
Taking into consideration these problems, the Milestone Decision 
Authority approves the acquisition strategy and program baseline. Entry into the System 
Demonstration and Development Phase is then approved (Figure 11).  
Entrance criteria for the System Demonstration and Development phase 
are technology maturity, available funds and approved JCIDC document – Capability 
Development Document (CDD). Technical maturity determines the path to be taken by 
the program. A program entering that phase must have developed a systems and 
operational architecture (this is a condition to be met at the Milestone B Decision Point).  
That phase is driven by the Key Performance Parameters (KPP) found in the CDD. This 
Phase contains two main elements (Figure 12): 
• System Integration – the main objective is to integrate subsystems, reduce 
system-level risk and complete detailed design. The acquisition program 
enters that part of the SDD when the PM has the technical solution for the 
program (technology maturity), but the program is not yet integrated into a 
complete and coherent system.53 
• System Demonstration – the main objective is to prove that system can 
operate in a useful way consistent with the KPPs. This element of the SDD 
should be accomplished when the system proves that it can operate under 
requirements set by the future environment, using the selected prototype. 
The system should then meet (or exceed) exit criteria and entrance 
requirements for the Milestone C.  Accomplishment of that phase requires 
a decision made by the MDA to continue the program in Milestone C or 
drop the program and search for another alternative.54 
                                                 
52 JCIDS deals with the analysis of doctrines, organizations, training, materials, personnel, and facilities in an 
integrated process to define gaps in warfighting capabilities. JCIDC also proposes solutions to those problems.   
53 DoD, DoDI 5000.2, para. 3.7.3. 




Figure 12.   Elements of the System Development and Demonstration Phase (SDD). 
 
The System Integration Phase is followed by the Design Readiness 
Review (DRR), which is an opportunity for mid-phase assessment. Successful 
completion of the DRR ends the System Integration Phase and begins the System 
Demonstration Phase.   
b. Milestone C and Production and Deployment Phase 
The decision regarding commitment to production of a new system is 
made by the MDA at the Milestone C Decision Point. A new system receives 
authorization to be produced at the Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) level.  The MDA 
will approve entry to the LRIP when a reasonable degree of confidence of system 
operational effectiveness is attained.  
In some cases, Milestone C authorizes entry into full-scale production, 
bypassing the LRIP. Milestone C also authorizes a limited operational testing for the 
elements with no production components such as automated information systems or 
software systems.55 
                                                 
















The main objective of the Production and Deployment phase (P&D) is to 
achieve the operational capability which meets the mission needs requirements. Entrance 
to P&D depends on the following factors: 
• Acceptable performance in development, test and evaluation, operational 
assessment 
• No significant manufacturing risk 
• Mature software capability 
• Manufacturing process under control 
• Approved Initial Capabilities Document (ICD)  
• Approved Capability Production Document (CPD) 
• Acceptable interoperability  
• Acceptable operational supportability 
• Demonstration that the system is affordable through whole lifecycle.56 
The P&D Phase consists of Low Rate Initial Production and Full Rate 
Production and Deployment. It also includes the Full Rate Production Decision Review.  
The LRIP must result in completion of manufacturing development. 
Manufacturing development should be sufficient to produce a quantity necessary to 
provide production articles for Initial Operational Test and Evaluation (IOT&E). 
Manufacturing development should also establish an initial production base for the 
system and permit an increase to full rate production.57  
LRIP quantities should be minimized and any production must be 
approved by the Milestone Decision Authority. Further, the MDA is responsible for 
assessment of the cost and benefits of a break in production versus annual buys, when the 
LRIP quantities are expected to be larger than predicted. 
The MDA considers the initial operational tests, evaluation, and live fire 
test in the Full Rate Production Decision Review. A favorable review authorizes the 
program to be transferred into Full Rate Production and Deployment. 
                                                 
56 Cochrane, “Introduction to Defense Acquisition Management,” 55. 
57 DoD, DoDI 5000.2, para. 3.8.3.1. 
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During the Full Rate Production and Deployment phase, the system is 
produced and delivered to units for operational use. The PM must ensure that the system 
is produced and deployed at an economical rate in accordance with the user’s needs. 
Operation and Support begins as soon as the first systems are deployed. The Production 
and Deployment phase therefore overlaps the Operation and Support phase. 
3. Operation and Support (O&S): Sustainment and Disposal 
The most important goal of a successful strategy is to ensure that fielded systems 
are supportable. There are two main approaches to the O&S Phase: System Engineering 
(SE) (which includes all technical activity), and Performance Based Logistics (PBL) – 
(purchase of support as an integrated, affordable performance package).58  
Weapon system costs and performance in the O&S phase is the ultimate measure 
of the success of the acquisition program. Measurement of outcomes is possible within 
the Total Life Cycle Systems Management (TLCSM). To meet that objective, TLCSM 
utilizes single point accountability tools and Performance Based Logistic. 
During the O&S phase, full operational capability of the weapon system is 
achieved. Each element of logistics support is assessed, and operational readiness is also 
evaluated. These two concerns, logistics and readiness, dominate the O&S Phase. This 
phase is also divided in two main elements: Sustainment and Disposal. 
a. Sustainment 
Effective Sustainment begins with the design and development of a 
maintainable and reliable system, made possible by application of the system engineering 
methodology. Sustainment includes: 
• Supply  
• Maintenance 
• Transportation 
• Sustaining engineering 
• Data management 
• Configuration management 
                                                 
58 USAF, “AFI 63-101,” para. 6.5. 
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• Manpower and personnel  
• Training 
• Habitability and survivability 
• Environmental concerns 
• Safety 
• Occupational health 
• Protection of critical program information and information technology. 
During this phase, weapon systems modifications are possible. They are 
done on a requirements basis, to improve systems performance and reduce ownership 
costs. System improvement programs are therefore initiated as a result of experience with 
the fielded system and may lead to life extension.  
b. Disposal 
Disposal of the fielded weapon system takes place at the end of useful life. 
The PM plans the disposal activities during the operational life. The PM is also 
accountable for minimizing the DoD’s exposure to environmental safety, security, and 
health issues. The environmental safety is very important due to two reasons. First, most 
modern weapon systems may pose harm to the environment and influence it for many 
years. Second, the disposal very often must meet the requirements of international treaties 
or other legal considerations which would require intensive management of the system 
disposal. 
B. TOTAL LIFE CYCLE SYSTEM MANAGEMENT (TLCSM)  
“Total Life Cycle System Management is the implementation, management, and 
oversight by the Program Manager, of all activities associated with the acquisition, 
development, production, fielding, sustainment and disposal of a DoD weapon or 
material systems across its life cycle.”59 The PM is responsible and accountable for the 
accomplishment of program objectives throughout the life cycle. TLCSM mandates 
major system development decisions regarding operational effectiveness and logistic 
affordability. TLCSM includes the following elements: 
                                                 
59 Defense Acquisition University, “Defense Acquisition Guidebook” (2004), para. 5.1.1. 
http://akss.dau.mil/dag/DoD5000.asp?view=document (accessed April 17, 2006). 
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• Single point of accountability (Program Manager) 
• Evolutionary acquisition strategies 
• Life Cycle Logistics (LCL) in the system engineering process  
• Supportability as  a major element of performance 
• Reducing logistic footprint through increased reliability 
• Performance based logistic strategies 
• Sustainment strategy reviews.60 
Under the TLCSM, Life-Cycle Logistics (LCL) is a major consideration during 
acquisition of the weapon system and its operational life cycle.  LCL should ensure that 
supportability requirements are understood and consistent with costs, performance, and 
schedule through the entire life cycle of the weapon system.  
Within LCL, Performance Based Logistics is the DoD’s preferred approach to 
system support. The second dimension of the LCL is System Engineering (SE). SE must 
ensure that supportability requirements are met during the design, development, and 
sustainment of the weapon system (Figure 13). 
1. System Engineering (SE)  
The SE processes are system solutions. A major objective is to balance 
performance, risk, costs, and schedule outcomes.  
SE plays an important role in the DoD’s Acquisition Process. It is applied 
throughout the process from capability needs to an operational system. Accordingly, SE 
is applied very early in the concept definition and it is present through the entire life 
cycle. 
                                                 
60 Defense Acquisition University, “Defense Acquisition Guidebook” (2004), para. 4.1.3. 
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Figure 13.   Conceptual Framework for the Total Life Cycle System Management 
(From: Defense Acquisition University, “Defense Acquisition Guidebook” 
(2004) para. 5.5.1.). 
 
System Engineering provides a menu of processes which help coordinate and 
integrate activities throughout the life cycle. The main SE tool is the technical 
framework, which facilitates decision making by achieving balance between 
performance, cost, schedule, and risk. Successful implementation of SE will result in a 
total system solution which has the following characteristics: 
• Responsive to changing technical, production, operating environment 
• Adaptive to needs of the users 
• Balanced among requirements, design consideration, constraints, and 
program budgets.61 
                                                 
61 DAU, “Defense Acquisition Guidebook,” para. 4.1.1. 
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The SE process is repeated in nature. It consists of four major elements: 
requirements analysis, functional analytical allocation, synthesis, and systems analysis 
and control. The feedback among these elements is essential to the overall process, as 
illustrated in Figure 14. 
 
 
Figure 14.   The System Engineering Process (From: Defense Systems Management 
College, “Acquisition Logistic Guide,” 3rd ed., 1997). 
 
SE is applied during the each phase of the acquisition process. During the 
development phase a progressive change in the central focus of SE is observed. In the 
early phases SE focuses on components. When the system develops, the focus is 
transferred to the subsystem level. Finally, when system maturity is achieved, SE focuses 
on system level considerations. Furthermore, logistic considerations are elements of SE 
and they must be integrated in the SE process from the very beginning. Supportability 
analysis must also be a vital part of the SE process. 
a. Supportability Analysis 
Supportability analysis is conducted by the PM through the entire life 
cycle of the weapon system (Appendix H). The initial analysis should focus on relations 
involving operational performance readiness and planned support structures. 
Supportability analysis can also include a numbers of tools, practices, or techniques. The 
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results constitute the framework for design requirements regarding performance and 
logistics. The PM is responsible for the decisions either to continue a program or modify 
it based on supportability analysis. The Total Ownership Cost (TOC) plays a major role 
in the overall selection process. Support concepts for all systems provide cost effective, 
total lifecycle logistic support.62 When considering alternative systems, the PM may use 
the following criteria: 
• Life-cycle cost 
• Diagnostic characteristics 
• Energy characteristics 
• Battle damage repair characteristics 
• Transportability characteristics 
• Facilities requirements.63 
Supportability factors are also important elements of supportability 
analysis, and are integral to the program performance specification. The following items 
may be used when considering supportability issues: 
• Operation and maintenance personnel constraints 
• Personnel skill level constraints 
• Life-cycle and O&S cost constraints 
• Target percentages of systems failures correctable at each maintenance 
level 
• Mean down time in the operational environment 
• Turn-around time in the operational environment 
• Standardization and interoperability requirements 
• Built-infault isolation capability 
• Transportability requirements.64 
                                                 
62 DAU, “Defense Acquisition Guidebook,” 2004, para. 4.4.9.2. 
63 Defense Systems Management College, “Acquisition Logistic Guide,” 3rd ed., 1997, para. 8.5.1. 
http://www.dau.mil/pubs/pdf/alg1.pdf (accessed May 4, 2006). 
64 DSMC, ”Acquisition Logistic Guide,” para. 8.5.1.1. 
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b. Reliability, Maintainability, and Availability (R,M&A) 
R,M&A issues must be considered from the very beginning of the 
lifecycle of the weapon system. They must meet operational requirements and contribute 
to the reduction of TOC.  
(1) Reliability. It is the probability that weapon system will 
perform its functions in a satisfactory manner for a specific period of time, or during the 
duration of a mission under stated conditions. Reliability function may be expressed by 
the quotation: 
( ) ( )tFtR −=1 , 
where F(t) is the probability that system will fail by time t.65 
The failure rate is defined as a number of failures per measure of 
unit life.  
MTBF
rateFailure 1_ = , 
where MTBF is Mean Time Between Failures.  
Additionally we can distinguish two components of reliability:  
• Mission Reliability is the probability that the weapon system will perform 
functions essential to accomplish a mission, under a certain period of time 
and under stated conditions.  
• Logistic Reliability is the probability that no corrective maintenance will 
be performed until completing the scheduled mission profile.  
(2) Maintainability.  Maintainability is the probability that the 
weapon system will be retained in, or restored to an operational condition in a certain 
period of time if the prescribed procedures and resources are used. Maintainability is the 
characteristic of a weapon system which has been already fielded. It also indicates the 
maintenance required to keep that system in operational status. This characteristic is 
measured by Mean Time to Repair. A mathematic statement of that characteristic is 
expressed by the Mean Corrective Maintenance Time equation:  
                                                 
65 Benjamin S. Blanchard, Logistic Engineering and Management, 6th ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson 








== 1  
where Mcti is total active corrective maintenance cycle time for each maintenance action, 
and n is the sample size.  
Maintainability is one of the factors which determine life cycle 
costs. Maintenance costs are affected by the decisions made during the early stages of the 
weapon system life cycle. Considering maintenance cost, the following criteria may be 
applied when developing a weapon system: 
• Cost per maintenance action ($/MA) 
• Maintenance cost per system operating hour ($/OH) 
• Maintenance cost per month ($/month) 
• Maintenance cost per mission or mission segment ($/mission) 
• The ratio of maintenance cost to total life cycle cost.66 
(3) Availability. Availability is defined as a probability that a 
weapon system is in operable state at a beginning of the mission when the mission is 
called at a random point in time. That parameter reflects the readiness of the system. 67 It 
is expressed by quotation:  
Down timeUp time
Up timetyAvailabili +=  
Availability should be measured accordingly to the specific 
mission. The Operational Availability (Ao) is a very important indicator of system 
readiness. Ao is expressed by the following mathematical relationship:  
MLDTMMTMTBM




                                                 
66 Blanchard, Logistic Engineering and Management, 72. 
67 DSMC, ”Acquisition Logistic Guide,” para. 10.3.2.5. 
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• MTBM – Mean Time Between Maintenance – mean operating time plus 
mean standby time in operational conditions 
• MMT – Mean Maintenance Time – includes mean time for corrective and 
preventive actions 
• MLDT – Mean Logistics Down Time – combination of the logistics 
delays plus administrative delays 
c. Achieving Affordable System Operational Effectiveness (SOE) 
The SOE concept explores relationships between system performance, 
availability, process efficiency, and life cycle cost. That matrix provides the context for 
the PM to make “trades”.  The SOE requires involvement of every organization and 
individual engaged in the management of the weapon system. The SOE approach may be 
applied during the development of the new system as well as to modernization of a 
fielded system.  The SOE concept is composed of the following elements (Figure 15): 
• System Performance – designed system capabilities and functions 
• Technical Effectiveness – a balance between system performance and 
system availability.  
• System Availability – includes reliability, maintainability, supportability 
(discussed above), and productivity. Productivity is the degree to which 
the design of the weapon system facilitates timely, affordable, and high 
quality manufacture, assembly and delivery of the weapon system.  
• Process Efficiency – reflects how well the system may be produced, 
operated, and maintained.68 It also reflects the degree to which the logistic 
infrastructure and footprint have been reduced to ensure an agile, 
deployable, and operationally effective system.  
                                                 
68 DAU, “Defense Acquisition Guidebook,” para. 5.2.2. 
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Figure 15.   Affordable System Operational Effectiveness (From: DAU, “Defense 
Acquisition Guidebook” (2004) paragraph 5.2.2).  
 
2. Performance Based Logistics (PBL) 
Performance Based Logistics is the DoD’s approach to product support 
implementation.  
[The] PM shall develop and implement performance based logistics 
strategies that optimize total system availability while minimizing cost and 
logistic footprint. Sustainment strategies shall include the best use of 
public and private sector capabilities through government/industry 
partnering initiative, in accordance with statutory requirements.69 
PBL uses performance based acquisition strategies which are developed, refined 
and implemented during the acquisition program or as a result of assessment support 
alternatives in a fielded system. The essence of PBL is to buy performance, unlike the 
traditional approach of buying individual parts and repair actions.  PBL does not favor 
either commercial or governmental providers. The decision is based upon best value 
                                                 
69 DoD, DoDI 5000.1, Enclosure 1.17. 
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determinations, the best mix of public and private capabilities and strategies, 
infrastructures, skills, and performance to meet weapon system requirements. This is the 
main objective of PBL and changes the approach to logistics: the PM does not tell 
provider how to do it but the PM will tell what he/she wants.70 That approach allows the 
best private business practices to enter the public sector.  
Buying performance outcomes is common to every PBL practice, in theory. 
However, to meet specific requirements, PBL must be tailored to the final product which 
is ready to be fielded. Application of PBL to, for example, Fighter Aircraft and Armed 
Fighting Vehicles may look similar in concept, but will be completely different in 
application. That is why the application of PBL to fielded systems may have a variety of 
shapes and forms.  
Because PBL is defined as a strategy for buying performance, it is important to 
set metrics to measure that performance. These allow the PM to select the component to 
buy with the highest value for the weapon system. In order to establish metrics, the PM 
must work with the users, who have potential capability to define requirements of the 
weapon system. By establishing accurate requirements, PBL has a higher probability to 
be implemented in the most efficient way. 
                                                 
70 Defense Acquisition University, “Performance Based Logistics: Program Managers Product Support Guide,” 
(Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Acquisition University Press, 2005), para. 2.2., http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA435149 




Figure 16.   Spectrum of PBL Strategies. (From: Acquisition Community Connection, 
PBL Toolkit – Allocate Work, 
https://acc.dau.mil/simplify/ev_en.php?ID=29846_201&ID2=DO_TOPIC). 
 
The top five PBL top-level metric objectives are defined in the Under Secretary of 
Defense Memorandum:71 
• Operational Availability – the percent of time a weapon system is 
available for a mission 
• Operational Reliability – a weapon system reliability measurement to meet 
mission’s needs and objectives (objectives may by sortie, launch, 
destination, et cetera. Cost Per Unit Usage – total operating cost divided 
by unit performance measurement for a given weapon system 
• Logistic Footprint – government or contractor presence while deploying 
the weapon system. It includes inventory, equipment, facilities, personnel, 
real estate, transportation, and others Logistic Response Time – elapsed 
time for the logistics system after demand signal has been received.  
Recent examples of PBL implementation in already fielded systems show that 
PBL is an effective technique to optimize total system supportability (see Appendix I). 
                                                 
71 DAU, “Performance Based Logistics,” para 2.2. 
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C. CONCLUSION 
The decision to acquire and field a modern weapon system is multidimensional. It 
will determine military capability; it is always connected with the problems of resource 
allocation and making trade-off decisions while the system is developed. That is why 
Total Life Cycle System Management is essential – from the decision to create 
requirements to removal from service. TLCSM begins when the requirements are 
approved. It continues through the Concept & Technology Development phase, System 
Development & Demonstration phase, Production & Deployment phase, and Operation & 
Support phase. During these phases, the appropriate management of the costs of the 
weapon system will result in the most affordable Total Ownership Cost. Failure in 
TLCSM will result in TOC increase (and decrease in affordability). To better understand 
that concept, our next chapter will focus on TOC - emphasizing the O&S cost which 
consists of 78 percent of overall TOC.   
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IV. OPERATING AND SUPPORT (O&S) COSTS 
Typically, the primary concern for countries acquiring a new weapon system from 
arms exporters is the initial acquisition cost. Not enough attention is given to all Life 
Cycle Costs (LCC) in general, and to Operating and Support (O&S) costs in particular. 
The United States handled its own defense acquisition process in this way before the 
1980s. The subject of estimating O&S costs gained the attention of government officials 
and lawmakers during the 1980’s when they realized that “roughly half of the budget for 
the DoD pays for annual O&S costs.”72  
As mentioned in the preceding chapter, the most important element of a 
successful strategy to contain O&S costs is ensuring that fielded systems are supportable. 
Reducing O&S costs is as important as reducing acquisition costs. This chapter provides 
a brief overview of how to assess O&S costs by means of Life-Cycle Cost Analysis 
(LCCA). It also summarizes the foundational literature used in this research to establish a 
Cost Estimating Relationship (CER) for LCC and O&S. In addition, methods and 
outcomes from previous research regarding O&S are presented.  
A. LIFE-CYCLE COST / TOTAL OWNERSHIP COST 
Life-Cycle Costs (LCC) and Total Ownership Cost (TOC) constitute the main 
concepts used by DoD for reliability and maintenance for complex weapon systems in 
defense. DoD Directive 5000.1, The Defense Acquisition System and DoD Instruction 
5000.2, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System (further referred as DoD 5000.2), 
make reference to these concepts. A basic attribute of a fighter aircraft is the ability to 
provide high performance over a long service life but with significant periods of 
downtime and high costs maintenance.  
The Defense Acquisition Guide defines LCC and TOC; it mentions that they “are 
similar in concept, but significantly different in scope and intent.”73 The LCC of a 
                                                 
72 Congress of the United States, “Operation and Support Costs for the Department of Defense” (Washington D.C.: 
Congressional Budget Office, July 1988), http://ftp.cbo.gov/ftpdoc.cfm?index=5542&type=1 (accessed March 20, 
2006). 
73 DAU, “Defense Acquisition Guide,” para. 3.1.1. 
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defense program includes Research and Development (R&D) costs, Investment costs, 
Operating and Support (O&S) costs and Disposal costs over the entire life-cycle. In 
addition to cost elements included in LCC, TOC consists of other costs associated with, 
for example, infrastructure and business processes that are not necessarily attributable to 
the weapon system program. Thus, LCC and TOC concepts are similar, but TOC is more 
comprehensive than LCC. 
 
Figure 17.   Program Life Cycle (Illustrative) (From: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 
Cost Analysis Improvement Group, “Operating and Support Cost-
Estimating Guide” (May 1992)).  
 
In condensed form, LCC includes the acquisition and ownership costs. Seldom 
affirms that “ownership costs – those of operation and support or maintenance - have 
frequently far exceeded procurement costs.”74  This fact has been proven by much 
empirical data. For instance, Table 1 provides a breakout of the costs incurred during the 
key program phases for two different weapon systems: a fighter aircraft (F-16) and a 
fighting vehicle (M-2). 
                                                 
74 Robert M. Seldon, Life Cycle Costing: A Better Method of Government Procurement, (Boulder, CO: Westview 
Press, 1979), 1. 
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Table 1.   Percentage of Life-Cycle Costs Incurred in Various Program Phases.75 
 
Weapon System R&D Investment O&S 
F-16 Fighter Aircraft 2% 20% 78% 
M-2 Fighting 
Vehicle 
2% 14% 84% 
 
In addition, other authors suggest that both LCC and TOC need to be considered 
holistically because all the costs are interrelated.76  The components of LCC must be 
considered in all acquisition decisions of a major weapon system. Accordingly, the USAF 
has incorporated the LCC concept to ensure that ownership cost objectives are 
established and that LCC is considered from the initial phases of the acquisition 
programs.77 
An LCCA is particularly important to determine the cost-effectiveness of a 
system in terms of O&S. In addressing this issue, the role of LCCA is to capture all the 
costs and to create visibility as conveyed through the “iceberg effect” showed in Figure 
18.78  In addition, LCC analysis is used to evaluate alternative support policies for 
maintenance of the weapon system. The following section introduces the concepts of 
LCCA which represent the practical application of LCC/TOC concepts.    
                                                 
75 OSD, GAIG, “Operating and Support Cost-Estimating Guide,” 2-3. 
76 Michael W. Boudreau and Brad R. Naegle, “Reduction of Total Ownership Cost,” NPS Acquisition Program, 25, 
http://www.nps.navy.mil/gsbpp/ACQN/publications/FY03/AM-03-004.pdf (accessed at April 11, 2006). 
77 Aeronautical Systems Center, “Life Cycle Cost Management Guidance for Program Managers,” (Wright-
Patterson AFB, OH, January 1994). 
78 Blanchard, Logistic Engineering and Management, 81. 
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Figure 18.   Total Visibility Cost (From: Blanchard, Logistic Engineering and 
Management, 81).  
 
1. Life Cycle Cost Analysis (LCCA) 
The LCCA is a sequence of analytical steps for evaluating alternative designs in 
terms of life-cycle costs. Blanchard presents an extended life-cycle cost analysis.79 Based 
on his model, an LCC cost estimate generally involves the use of a three-step procedure. 
In the first phase, the relevant categories of costs are identified. During the second step, a 
Cost Estimating Relationship (CER) is derived. Finally, the necessary data are collected 
from reliable databases and adjusted for inflation and other factors. The same steps 
should be followed in assessing the O&S costs, a component of LCC. 
a. Cost Breakdown Structure  
In the first step, the cost analyst should develop a Cost Breakdown 
Structure (CBS). In other words, costs may be broken down into logical, definite 
                                                 
79 Blanchard, Logistic Engineering and Management, 465. 
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subdivisions, considering the functional activity area or the major elements of the system. 
According to Blanchard,80 the CBS ought to exhibit the following basic characteristics: 
• all costs should be considered and identified in the Cost Breakdown 
Structure 
• all cost categories should be well defined; there should not be any 
doubling or omissions 
• the cost structure and categories should be coded in such a manner to 
allow for in-depth analysis of certain areas of interest while covering other 
areas with gross estimates 
• the CBS should be directly compatible with the Work Breakdown 
Structure (WBS)81 and with management accounting procedures used in 
collecting costs 
• the cost structure should allow for the identification of specific work 
packages that require close monitoring 
In developing a CBS one could follow two approaches: top-down or 
bottom-up. The top-down approach is employed with the purpose of determining the 
initial allocation of cost as a Design-to-Cost (DTC) requirement. The second technique, 
bottom-up, which will be used in our project, implies successive collection and 
summarizing of costs.  
As previously mentioned, LCC is typically divided into four phases: 
research and development, procurement, O&S, and disposal phase. This division is used 
mainly for cost estimating purposes. The following descriptions provide a brief summary 
of the costs associated with each life-cycle phase:  
• Research and Development costs start with program initiation at the 
conceptual phase through the end of engineering and manufacturing 
development.  R&D includes costs for feasibility studies, modeling, 
tradeoff analyses, engineering design, development, fabrication, assembly 
and test of prototype hardware and software, system test and evaluation, 
developing support equipment, and documentation 
• Production or Procurement includes costs associated with producing or 
procuring the physical parts of the system, and costs associated with initial 
logistic support requirements (i.e., support equipment, training, data, 
initial spares, and facilities) 
                                                 
80 Blanchard, Logistic Engineering and Management, 467. 
81 The concept of Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) will be developed later. 
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• Operation and support costs are incurred when systems are deployed and 
fielded. They include costs of sustaining operation, personnel and 
maintenance, consumable and reparable parts, and system modification 
• Retirement and Phase-out costs are associated with deactivating or 
disposing of a materiel system at the end of its useful life.  Disposing of a 
materiel system can result in additional costs or a salvage value.  These 
costs are normally insignificant compared to the total LCC. In some cases, 
disposal cost may be avoided by making the system available for sale 
Program phases overlap considerably; in particular, R&D may not be 
completed before procurement begins. Cost is a major consideration of system 
management and must be addressed in making decisions during all life-cycle phases. 
Having generated a CBS, the next step is to estimate the costs of each category. The 
paragraphs below summarize the key features of the three estimating techniques used in 
LCC assessments. 
Undoubtedly, several aspects of TOC are not controlled or even 
influenced by acquisition managers. For that reason, program cost estimates are normally 
focused on life-cycle cost or its elements. Situations where cost estimates support the 
acquisition system include affordability assessments, analyses of alternatives, cost-
performance trades, and establishment of program cost goals. In addition, more refined 
and discrete life-cycle cost estimates are used within the program office to support 
internal decision-making such as evaluations of engineering changes or competitive 
source selections. The following section presents relevant definitions of costs and 
summarizes the key features of the estimating techniques used in LCC assessments.  
The taxonomy of costs comprises different categories of costs. The 
definitions of costs provided below will serve to illustrate the concept of LCC and may 
help in LCCA. During LCCA, the analyst’s objective is to capture all costs and to create 
desired visibility.  
• First or Investment Cost - cost elements that do not recur after the system 
is acquired. They may include design and development costs, test and 
evaluation costs, unit purchase price, and installation and training costs. In 
some instances, these first costs are very high, exceeding the capabilities 
of the buyer. 
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• Fixed Cost - cost elements that are independent of variations in the level 
of operational activity; that is, are not related to the amount of system 
usage. Depreciation, maintenance, insurance, interest on invested capital, 
research, and part of administrative expenses are good examples of such 
costs. Fixed costs are usually difficult to change in the short run. 
• Variable Cost – a group of costs which are related in some way to the 
level of operational activity. These costs are normally associated with 
direct labor and material, fuel, energy, and so on; they may include direct 
and indirect costs. 
• Direct Cost - the cost elements most easily perceived. They are a direct 
result of system utilization. Taking an airplane as an example, the costs of 
fuel and the salary of mission personnel would be direct costs of the flying 
activity. 
• Indirect Cost - generally, these costs are difficult to evaluate, because they 
are not directly related to the operation of the system. Looking at the 
previous example, expenses with tires and maintenance personnel would 
be indirect costs. 
• Sunk or Past Cost – a group of costs that were already incurred in the past 
and cannot be altered by any future action. Although they may be 
significant in some circumstances, they should influence the decision 
making process only to the extent that they may serve as a basis for 
predictions. 
Given the categories of cost, it is appropriate to estimate all applicable 
costs for each of the categories in the CBS and for each year of the life-cycle.82  
2. Estimating Methods of Costs 
The Society of Cost Estimating and Analysis (SCEA) provides the following 
definition of cost estimating: “The art of approximating the probable cost or value of 
something based on information available at the time.”83  
As summarized in the “AoA Handbook”,84 there are both formal and informal 
methodologies available to the analyst to estimate cost. There are three primary formal  
 
                                                 
82 Blanchard, Logistic Engineering and Management, 81. 
83 Society of Cost Estimating and Analysis, “Glossary,” http://www.sceaonline.org/prof_dev/glossary-c.cfm 
(accessed April 13, 2006). 
84 Air Force Materiel Command, Analysis Handbook, A Guide for Performing an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) 
(Kirtland AFB, NM: Office of Aerospace Studies, February 2002), 
http://www.oas.kirtland.af.mil/AoAHandbook/index.html (accessed April 14, 2006). 
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approaches as follows: (a) the parametric estimating technique, (b) engineering build-up 
(bottom-up or grass roots), and (c) the analogy technique. The description and limitations 
of each technique is discussed below. 
a. Parametric Method 
The parametric method consists of one or more Cost Estimating Relationships 
(CERs) to develop projections of weapons costs using simple mathematical equations and 
logic. Developing CERS will be discussed in detail in a separate section of this chapter. 
A CER is an equation that relates one or more characteristics of a system to some element 
of its cost, where cost is related to one or more variables (i.e. volume, weight, or power). 
Since CERs are based on actual program cost history, they reflect the impacts of system 
growth, schedule changes, and engineering changes.  
The technique is used to measure and/or to estimate the cost associated 
with the development, manufacture, or modification of a specified end item and the 
measurement is based on the technical, physical, or other end item characteristics. This 
method is often used for training, data, peculiar support equipment, and systems 
engineering and program management. Factors and ratios allow the estimator to capture a 
large part of an estimate with limited descriptions of both: the historical database used to 
develop the factor and the program to be estimated. The use of a factor or ratio relating 
the cost of one entity to another is considered a form of parametric estimating (i.e. 
training and development costs might be estimated as 20% of production costs). 
Given the nature of the method, it appears appropriate at the early stages 
of a program, when there is limited program information and technical definition. Less 
visibility might be seen as main limitation, especially when costs are captured at a very 
high level.  
b. Engineering Build-Up Approach 
The engineering build-up approach is performed at a detailed level of the WBS. 
According to this technique, cost can be estimated for basic tasks (such as engineering 
design, tooling, fabrication of parts, manufacturing engineering, and quality control), but 
also for materials.  
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Engineering estimation produces detailed “bottom-up” estimates. The 
objective is to determine as accurately as possible all of the actions that occur in the “real 
world,” which usually involves breaking the system into sub-components, each cost 
being estimated separately.85 
Among disadvantages of this approach, the following are the most 
important: it is time-consuming, as the modeled processes must be well understood, and 
it requires detailed, accurate data. 
c. Analogy Method 
The analogy method uses actual costs from a similar program and adjusts 
for the new program's complexity and technical or physical differences to derive the 
estimate.  
This method is normally used early in a program cycle when there is 
insufficient actual cost data to use as a basis for a detailed approach. Engineering 
assessments are at the core of the approach, as they are necessary to ensure the best 
analogy has been selected and proper adjustments are made. On the other hand, they can 
also be a limiting factor.  
Thus, the analogy estimation is widely used as it avoids the weaknesses of 
the CERs. Historical databases available through the Visibility and Management of 
Support Costs (VAMOSC) system may be used to identify the operating costs of weapon 
systems. It also relies heavily on informal approaches that can be used when formal 
techniques are not practical, such as experts’ opinions.86 
A fourth technique, extrapolation from actual costs, is described by the 
DoD 5000.2. The actual cost method uses cost experience or trends (from prototypes, 




                                                 
85 OSD, “Operating and Support Cost-Estimating Guide,” 3-11. 
86 Ibid. 
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future costs for the same system. A key possible mistake to be avoided is using contract 
prices, which are associated with profitable ventures, as a substitute for actual cost 
experience.87  
3. Developing Cost Estimating Relationships (CER’s)  
A short but comprehensive definition of Cost Estimating Relationships (CERs) is 
offered by “Parametric Cost Estimating Handbook”. Thus, CERs are “mathematical 
expressions relating cost as the dependent variable to one or more independent cost 
driving variables.”88 
CERs are the key tool used in all phases involved by estimating program costs. 
Thus, CERs can be used as the primary basis for an estimate during the validation phase 
(because there is insufficient system definition to use anything else), or in later phases of 
estimating as a cross check of another estimating procedure. Once valid CERs have been 
developed, then parametric cost modeling can proceed. 
Given the above, proper CER development and application rely heavily upon 
mastering certain mathematical and statistical techniques. They also rely on estimating, 
meaning that probability plays a crucial role in predicting the actual cost of the project. 
Sound statistical concepts and techniques constitute the basis of the development of any 
valid CER.  
DoDI 5000.2 mentions that system definition typically includes Work Breakdown 
Structure (WBS) defined as a “hierarchy of product-oriented elements – hardware, 
software, data and services – that collectively comprise the system to be developed or 
produced.”89 The WBS provides the framework for a series of activities that cover all the 
steps involved by the program – from program planning to status reporting, including 
cost estimating, resource allocation, performance measurement, and technical assessment. 
                                                 
87 DoD, DoDI 5000.2, art. 3.7.3. 
88 Parametric Estimating Initiative Steering Committee, “Parametric Cost Estimating Handbook,” Bill Brundick 
eds., 38, http://www1.jsc.nasa.gov/bu2/PCEHHTML/pceh.htm (accessed February 20, 2006). 
89 DoD, DoDI 5000,2, art. 3.7.1. 
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As observed in the “Parametric Cost Estimating Handbook,” consistency in 
system engineering and project management is directly correlated with the accuracy of 
each of the WBS elements and cost estimating capability on the one hand, and (even 
more important), with the resulting cost model on the other hand.  
The usefulness of a CER is dependent upon the soundness of the database from 
which it is developed and the appropriateness of the CER to what is to be estimated. 
While assembling the database is especially important, it is a difficult and time-
consuming activity. The lack of appropriate databases is a primary cause for there being 
only a small number of valid CERs. There is no agreement among specialists regarding 
the primacy of either the development of a good database or hypothesizing what the CER 
should be. In either case, the analyst must accomplish a series of activities. 
First, the analyst hypothesizes a series of logical estimating relationships, which 
may be linear or curvilinear. The second activity consists of assembling a database: as 
noted, the data problem is fundamental. Considerable time and effort is dedicated to 
collecting data, adjusting that data to ensure consistency and comparability, and 
providing for proper storage of information so that it can be rapidly retrieved when 
needed.   
In any case, developing an estimating relationship involves discussions with 
engineers to identify potential cost driving variables, scrutiny of the technical and cost 
proposals, and identification of key cost relationships.  
Once the database is developed and hypothesis is determined and tested, the next 
activity to be accomplished by the analyst is to mathematically model the CER using 
linear and curvilinear forms, such as the graphical method and the Least Squares Best Fit 
(LSBF) or the linear regression model method, all of which are provided by many 
statistical PC packages.   
In addition, application of the CER is necessary to forecast future costs or to cross 
check an estimate done with another technique.  In this respect, it is important to observe 
the difference between using either generic CERs or CERs which have been built for a 
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specific forecast. Obviously, the second category may be used with far more confidence 
than the first one. However, each type has both strengths and weaknesses.  
The following strengths of the CERs are the most cited in the literature: a) they 
are quick and easy to use, being based on an equation and the required input data; b) 
CERs can be used with limited system information, and thus are especially useful in the 
R&D phase; c) a CER is a statistically sound predictor, if derived from a sound database, 
so that it is a reliable indicator of further estimates. 
The following are among the major weaknesses of the CERs. First, they are 
sometimes too simplistic to forecast costs; if available, another estimating approach 
should be selected. Second, database-related problems may impact negatively on the 
applicability of a particular CER. In this respect, the user has the responsibility to validate 
the purpose of the CER estimates, the quality of data used, and how they were 
normalized.  
The modeling uncertainties translate into “risk” of producing an unrealistic cost 
estimate within a given percentage of the actual project cost.  Such uncertainties can be 
grouped into two major categories, which are described below.   
The first category of risk refers to the uncertainty of any organization to perform 
as planned due to unexpected resource or scheduling delays in the scope of effort to 
produce the design, prototype, or product. Given the causes attached, this sort of 
uncertainty can be controlled through specifications in the scope of work agreed between 
the customer and contractor, which would result in a decrease in the amount of contract 
and engineering change proposals (CCE/ECPs) and unnecessary rework. 
The second category refers to uncertainty associated with the development and 
thus usefulness of any cost model, which includes: a) uncertainty associated with 
omission of a key cost driver; b) misspecification of the form of the model equation; c) 
modeling limitations associated with a lack of data to validate the cost model, and, d) 
lack of data consistency across multiple project databases.  
In order to reduce the risks above, appropriate measures can be used to keep 
uncertainty within reasonable limits. For instance, uncertainty associated with omission 
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of key cost drivers is addressed through development of historical cost data by product 
line, defined as WBS, and systematic understanding of the types of costs associated with 
development, prototype, and production programs. The avoidance of the misspecification 
of the model equation requires careful review of in-house and available industry data, in 
order to establish the basis of the model. The use of additional relevant data would reduce 
the uncertainties attached to the third modeling limitations. In this respect, as the 
literature emphasizes, cost modeling of a new technological or programmatic area usually 
involves lack of data. Fourthly, risks associated to data consistency can be diminished by 
using WBS cost elements which are standardized across projects.90 
In conclusion, knowledgeable use of Life-Cycle Cost can be crucial in assuring 
affordability of fielded systems. The challenge to the acquisition logistician is to 
implement these concepts actively and aggressively through participation in the various 
Integrated Process Teams (IPTs). One task for the lead acquisition logistics manager is to 
provide support for the O&S cost estimate, the largest component of LCC.  
B. OPERATING & SUPPORT (O&S) COSTS 
O&S costs have a double role in conducting the life cycle management of a 
weapon system.  First, O&S costs represent a major part of the LCC, and are therefore 
important in assessing affordability. Second, as a RAND study explicitly mentions, 
“O&S costs reflect the commitment of a military establishment to readiness.”91 O&S cost 
information could support a design-to-cost program and management reviews during the 
first two phases of life cycle, assist in choosing between alternate systems, and support 
budget estimates. Therefore, O&S cost estimates have taken on greater importance in 
acquisition decisions and in resource planning.  
O&S costs have a number of distinctive characteristics that single them out from 
other factors of LCC. O&S costs occur annually, over a long time-span. Therefore, cost 
analysts have to predict trends for different types of costs such as personnel or material 
costs. This endeavor is particularly difficult in today’s context and it makes the O&S 
                                                 
90 PEISCP, “Parametric Cost Estimating Handbook,” 35-37. 
91 Gregory G. Hildebrandt and Man-bing Sze, An Estimation of USAF Aircraft Operating and Support Cost 
Relations, (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, May 1990), 1. 
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estimates more sensitive to assumptions than other types. The next sections will present 
some of the complexities of O&S estimating, O&S cost breakdown structure, and O&S 
cost drivers. 
1. O&S Cost Breakdown Structure 
Stewart points out that because weapon systems must often serve a long lifetime 
and because the maintenance, operation, and repair of many weapon systems exceed their 
initial acquisition costs, the DoD put a considerable emphasis on analysis and exposure of 
LCC.92   
O&S costs are those incurred for peacetime operations and maintenance of a 
system throughout its life cycle. O&S costs comprise expenses with fuel, lubricants, and 
repair parts and their related maintenance, plus the costs associated with modifications. 
For a typical weapon system O&S costs represent 70% or more of the system LCC.93 
Figure 19 illustrates a typical distribution of LCC. 
 
                                                 
92 Rodney D. Stewart, Cost Estimating, 2nd ed. (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1991), 201-202. 
93 United States General Accounting Office, “Air Force Operating and Support Costs Reductions Need Higher 
Priority,” (Washington D.C.: National Security and International Affairs Division, August 2000), 
http://www.gao.gov/archive/2000/ns00165.pdf (accessed March 26, 2006). 
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Figure 19.   Nominal Life-Cycle Cost of Typical 1980 DoD Acquisition Program (From: 
United States General Accounting Office, “Air Force Operating and Support 
Cost Reductions Need Higher Priority,” (August 2000)). 
 
While DoD Handbook 881 provides a common framework for procurement cost 
estimates, the Operating and Support Cost-Estimating Guide provides a standardized cost 
element structure for O&S cost estimates. Regarding O&S costs, the 1992 version of the 
Guide has seven major cost elements: mission personnel, unit-level consumption, 
intermediate maintenance (external to unit), depot maintenance, contractor support, 
sustaining support, and indirect support. A schematic representation of O&S cost 
breakdown structure is presented in Figure 20.  
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Figure 20.   O&S Cost Breakdown Structure. 
 
A detailed Cost Breakdown Structure for an aircraft, as offered in the 1992 
Operating and Support Cost-Estimating Guide, is presented in Appendix I. The new 
version of the Operating and Support Cost-Estimating Guide (2002 draft) proposes a 
generic O&S cost-estimating structure with six cost elements. The CBS is designed to 
capture as many relevant costs as practical within the O&S phase and is essential to LCC 
analysis.  
2. O&S Cost Drivers 
Since O&S costs typically exceed both development and investment costs over 
the functional life of a system, the O&S costs are a primary concern in assessing the 
TOC.  
O&S cost estimating may be a difficult endeavor because the costs in this 
category are affected by various considerations. In general, there are four major types of 
factors which have to be considered: the systems technical characteristics, operating 









concept, maintenance concept, and relevant cost elements (cost drivers).94 The analyst 
should determine the quantitative and qualitative influence of these factors on the system 
being analyzed.   
a. System Technical Characteristics 
The analyst has to determine the system characteristics that impact O&S 
costs, such as: 
• design and physical parameters such as weight, size, design approach, and 
degree of modularity 
• required performance characteristics such as reliability and 
maintainability, availability, redundancy levels, etc 
• required interfaces with other systems, equipment, and support equipment 
• required level of technology. 
Since performance characteristics (reliability, maintainability) and 
physical characteristics (size, weight, etc.) are strongly related to O&S costs, they are 
generally used in the O&S cost estimation. For example, to forecast the frequency of 
maintenance actions that will take place and to predict the duration of repair actions, the 
cost analyst uses Mean-Time-between-Failure (MTBF) and Mean-Time-to-Recovery 
(MTTR) measures of system reliability and maintainability, respectively.  
b. Operating Concept 
The operating concept is closely related to the system usage rate. An 
increase or decrease in usage has a corresponding in O&S costs. The majority of O&S 
cost elements vary linearly with usage.  In the case of an aircraft, fuel, spare parts, and 
maintenance and repair costs are directly related to the “op tempo” (operational tempo, 
generally hours per aircraft per month). Knowing the op tempo, the analyst can properly 
adjust historical data from analogous systems, or plan for irregular supplementary usage. 
In addition, deployment concepts may affect everything from the replacement rate of 
support equipment that needs to be replenished to numbers of unit personnel. 
 
                                                 
94 Federal Aviation Administration, Life Cycle Cost Estimating Handbook, para. 13.4.2,  http://www.faa.gov/asd/ia-
or/lccehb.htm (accessed April 12, 2006). 
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c. Maintenance Concept 
In the past, system technical requirements related to the accomplishment 
of the mission. Items such as principal equipment and mission personnel were the 
elements which got analysts’ attention. In newer practices, system maintenance has 
gained more consideration because resources are diminishing, and there is a requirement 
to extend the life cycle of operational systems. Therefore, as Blanchard points out, the 
prime mission-oriented segments and support capability have to be considered on an 
integrated basis. As a result, a maintenance concept must be developed to state how the 
system is to be supported and what the effects are on design.95  
The maintenance concept describes how the system will be maintained 
and is documented in the maintenance plan, which details procedures and resources for 
support of the system. In Blanchard’s view, the maintenance concept includes: 
maintenance levels to be used with major functions accomplished at each level, repair 
policies, organizational responsibilities, maintenance support elements, effectiveness 
requirements, and environment.96  
A major component of the maintenance concept definition is the structure 
of maintenance levels to be used in support of the system. Maintenance, both corrective 
and preventive, may be accomplished at the site where the system is used (organizational 
maintenance), at specialized organizations (intermediate maintenance) and/or at a depot 
or contractor’s facilities (depot level).  For example, a hypothetical maintenance concept 
is presented in Figure 21. The figure depicts the levels of maintenance and other 
effectiveness factors such as MTBF and logistics flow times.  
The number of levels of maintenance affects the O&S cost estimate. Moreover, 
the type of maintenance resources required is important. In summary, the maintenance 
concept has to be considered in both the design and costs estimating processes. 
                                                 
95 Blanchard, Logistic Engineering and Management, 139. 




Figure 21.   Maintenance Concept (After: Blanchard, Logistic Engineering and 
Management, 145). 
 
d. Relevant Cost Elements 
When developing an estimate, the greatest amount of effort should be 
expended on those cost elements that account for a significant portion of total O&S costs, 
can be affected by program decisions or assist in distinguishing among alternatives. 
These are the cost drivers. In some cases, the term “cost driver” means a parameter or 
characteristics that drive cost; but in the majority of cases, the “cost driver” represents the 
parameter or characteristic with a large impact on cost. A cost driver is defined as “a 
program, system characteristic, or parameter that has a direct or indirect effect of 
changing cost.”97   
                                                 
97 DSMC, “Acquisition Logistics Guide,” art. 15.3. 
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O&S costs may be better managed by identifying their cost drivers. This is 
because it facilitates finding avenues for cost reduction. Therefore it is essential to 
identify and continuously monitor the cost drivers. The analyst can then lay out a CBS by 
outlining the expected O&S cost elements. The next step is to estimate these cost 
elements. The following section presents some of the particulars of the O&S cost 
estimating process. 
3. O&S Cost Estimating 
O&S cost estimating is realized by applying one of the cost estimating methods 
previously presented (analogy, parametric, engineering, or extrapolation from actual 
costs). Most O&S analyses are accomplished using a combination of these estimating 
techniques; secondary methods serve to cross-check the primary method employed. 
Choosing which method(s) to use is the cost analyst’s decision, based on the requirement 
for the cost analysis and what data are available. 
Even though the same cost estimating methods are employed for the other 
components of the LCC, O&S cost estimating has some unique aspects.98 In O&S 
estimating, the analyst may well find the following:  
• An O&S Cost Estimating Structure (CES) which differs substantially from 
the acquisition product oriented WBS 
• Heavy reliance on predictive models which tie personnel and maintenance 
considerations together for long range estimates of costs 
• Requirements for up to 40 years of projected operational use data to 
employ most models effectively99  
• A necessity to consider system constraints extending beyond system 
hardware (i.e., maintenance personnel, spares pipeline time frame, etc.).  
In general, O&S cost estimates are based on historical cost experience. A key 
factor is therefore a reliable database to track O&S costs. Increased visibility of these 
costs has become a requirement for DoD major systems since 1974 when the VAMOSC 
system was established. To facilitate a better visibility of O&S costs, the Air Force 
established the Air Force Total Ownership Cost (AFTOC) data system. AFTOC became 
                                                 
98 FAA, art. 13.4. 
99 The O&S costs estimate period is typically based on the nominal service life of the system. 
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the primary tool to assist analysts in the management and control of LCC. The historical 
data are also a major consideration in identifying the cost drivers, the topic of the 
previous section.  
In the last decades, cost analysts have deepened understanding of LCC/TOC. 
Summarizing these studies, two senior DoD officials, involved in the acquisition process, 
point out that “as modernization is deferred, weapons systems age and costs for 
operations and support (O&S) increase.”100 In the new economic context, with relatively 
flat budgets for defense, the higher O&S costs reduce the budgets for new, more reliable 
systems based on new technologies. This will lead to increasing costs and decreasing 
readiness, creating a vicious circle. For that reason, defense acquisitions policies have 
recently focused on controlling and reducing TOC. DoD approaches toward this goal are 
presented in the last part of this chapter. 
C. APPROACHES TO REDUCTION OF TOC: CAIV AND R-TOC 
The Cold War finished in the early 1990s and the Cold War arms race wound 
down. As a result, there was a dramatic fall in defense acquisition budgets. DoD has 
therefore implemented new strategies and rethought its acquisition processes. 
Recognizing that the majority of costs are determined early in the program, DoD put into 
practice Cost As an Independent Variable (CAIV). However, this initiative should not 
imply that cost could not be influenced later on. In a memorandum from 1999 Dr. 
Gansler urged services “to reduce the O&S of fielded systems (excluding manpower and 
fuel) by 20 percents.”101 In accomplishing this goal, DoD has implemented several pilot 
programs to minimize the cost of ownership in the context of a total system approach, 
i.e., Reduction of Total Ownership Cost (R-TOC). These two new initiatives, CAIV and 
R-TOC will be presented in the following sections. 
                                                 
100 Jay Mandelbaum and Spiros Pallas, “Reducing Total Ownership Cost in DoD. Increasing Affordability of DoD 
Systems,” PM (July, 2001), 76. 
101 Jacques S. Gansler, “Memorandum: Future Readiness,” (Washington D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 
May 10, 1999), http://ve.ida.org/rtoc/open/gansler051099.pdf (accessed April 26, 2006). 
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1. Cost as an Independent Variable (CAIV)  
The budgetary constraints forced the acquisition system to perceive cost as an 
independent variable; as a result cost has become as important as performance and has a 
major influence in weapon system decisions. Previously collected data proved that the 
best time to reduce costs is during initial acquisition or modification of the system.  
CAIV is defined as “an acquisition strategy focusing on cost-performance trade-offs in 
setting program goals.”102 Cost is first treated as a formal military requirement. The 
tradeoff denotes an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) which takes place in the pre-
acquisition phase to compare the estimates of costs, suitability, effectiveness, advantages, 
and disadvantages of the various alternative systems.103   
The CAIV concept is presented in detail by Dr. Benjamin Rush in an article in 
Acquisition Review Quarterly. Dr. Rush defines CAIV as a “new DoD strategy that 
makes total life-cycle cost as projected within the new acquisition environment a key 
driver of system requirements, performance characteristics, and schedules.”104 
Mentioning that the “life-cycle cost-performance/requirements tradeoff process is the 
heart of CAIV,”105 the author gives attention to requirements/cost-performance trades. 
Previously, available technology drove the performance goals. Currently, the system user 
has to consider lesser but acceptable performance; therefore, the user became a critical 
player in the CAIV process. In addition, when performance is stated as an overall system, 
performance goals or the number of system performance parameters is minimized.  
The CAIV process focuses on all four phases of the LCC of a program: R&D, 
production, O&S, and disposal. Notwithstanding, the main emphasis is given to 
production and O&S cost objectives. As Dr. Rush mentions, there are significant 
problems estimating production and O&S costs during the development phase. For 
instance, in the case of O&S, cost objectives typically would be an annual cost per 
                                                 
102 Defense Acquisition University, Defense Acquisition Deskbook, Version 3.1, 30 September 1999, 
http://akss.dau.mil/docs/ord0d.doc (accessed April 20, 2006). 
103 Boudreau and Naegle, “Reduction of Total Ownership Cost,” 25. 
104 Benjamin C. Rush, “Cost As an Independent Variable,” Acquisition Review Quarterly (Spring 1997), 162. 
105 Ibid., 162. 
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deployable unit (e.g. squadron) or individual system (e.g. aircraft). Most difficult to 
predict are O&S costs, primarily because they occur over many years. Supportability-
related cost-performance parameters, such as Cost-Per-Operating-Hour (for aircraft), 
should influence CAIV principles; as the flagship program proved, the CAIV process can 
reduce O&S costs by establishing aggressive goals for key performance parameters such 
as MTBF and MTTR.106  
The Defense Acquisition Guidebook describes how a CAIV strategy should be 
implemented. The CAIV plan has to be adjusted to each type of system. In general, it 
would consist of the following elements: cost goals for unit production cost and O&S 
costs, timing and content of trade-off studies, a cost performance integrated product team, 
incentives for supporting the CAIV plan, and metrics to assess progress and achievement 
of production and O&S cost goals.107 
In brief, the CAIV process involves developing, setting, and refining forceful 
production and O&S cost targets while meeting system requirements and affordability. 
Once system performance and objective costs are decided, through cost-performance 
trade-offs, cost becomes more of a constraint and less of a variable in meeting the 
mission need. CAIV is an initiative to reduce life-cycle costs and is particularly effective 
during system development. During the O&S phase CAIV is not effective. Therefore, 
another methodology has to be employed for reducing Total Ownership Cost later in the 
system life cycle.  
2. Reduction of Total Ownership Cost (R-TOC) 
Another approach to TOC is the Reduction of Total Ownership Cost (R-TOC); its 
focal point is the reduction of the O&S costs of a weapon system. R-TOC programs are 
mainly employed after the system is fielded.  The purpose of the R-TOC program is to 
achieve readiness improvements in weapon systems by improving the reliability of the 
systems or the efficiency of the processes used to support them.108 
                                                 
106 Rush, “Cost As an Independent Variable,” 168-169. 
107 DAU, “Defense Acquisition Guide,” para. 3.2.4. 
108 Institute for Defense Analysis, “Reduction of Total Ownership Costs,” http://rtoc.ida.org/rtoc/rtoc.html 
(accessed April 29, 2006). 
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In implementing R-TOC, the DoD adopted a Business Process Reengineering 
(BPR) perspective using elements such as: increasing the visibility and priority of the 
problem, changing the behavior of organizations and individuals regarding R-TOC, and 
institutionalizing R-TOC processes. The DoD has combined three strategies for 
approaching the R-TOC issue: setting strategic goals and objectives, starting to build 
momentum early, and developing and implementing a refined tactical plan.109  
Implementing the strategies previously mentioned through several pilot programs, 
the DoD achieved positive results. These were obtained by adopting private sector 
improvements in logistics and supply chain management. A memorandum from the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics summarizes these 
facts: 
Current R-TOC Pilot Programs are demonstrating that cost avoidance can 
be achieved by a variety of best practices. They include replacing high 
cost and low reliability components; enhancing supply chain efficiency; 
using smart decision support tools with cost visibility; establishing 
performance logistics support arrangements; leveraging commercial-off-
the-shell components; and initiating public-private partnerships.”110 
The 30 R-TOC Pilot programs, 10 for each service, have contributed significantly 
to reducing TOC, mainly because they were implemented for high–demand weapon 
systems. Therefore, even small O&S cost reduction resulted in drastic improvements in 
readiness and contributed to reducing Department of Defense ownership costs.  
Both strategies, CAIV and R-TOC, focus on cost reduction and are designed to 
reduce the total ownership cost of weapons systems. CAIV is a continuous, user-oriented, 
overarching acquisition strategy. Through this strategy, performance requirements are 
assessed against costs to maximize the value of a weapon system. The costs, however, are  
 
 
                                                 
109 Mandelbaum and Pallas, “Reducing Total Ownership Cost in DoD,” 77.  
110 Michael W. Wynne, Memorandum: Transformation through Reduction of Total Ownership Cost (R-TOC), 
(Washington D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, December 16, 2003), 
http://rtoc.ida.org/rtoc/open/SignedVersion-RTOC-Wynne%20Ltr-16Dec03.pdf (accessed April 26, 2006). 
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still too high for current budgets. While continuing to attack acquisition costs, there is 
need to reduce O&S costs as well. Initiatives such as CAIV and R-TOC reduce costs and 
improve readiness. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Understanding and identifying TOC is crucial to determining the operational 
success and cost-effectiveness of any weapon system. Recognizing this, current DoD 
policies require that program management ensure LCC considerations influence system 
design, systems engineering, and logistics engineering processes during the weapon 
system life cycle. In realizing this objective, the LCC estimate supports each management 
decision where cost is significant. The decisions with the highest probability of affecting 
LCC are those impacting O&S costs. Therefore, program managers must focus on the 
major factors that influence O&S costs, such as design characteristics, reliability, 
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V.  ANALYSIS AND FORECASTING OF OPERATING AND 
SUPPORT COST FOR F-16 C/D 
This chapter provides an analysis of O&S costs for the F-16C/D. It begins with a 
brief description of the AFTOC database and how data was collected for the empirical 
portion of this research. Then the chapter focuses on the details of O&S data from the 
FY04 Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG) format for O&S data. The percentage 
breakout for each fiscal year will be compared to one another to identify any trends that 
might be present. Actual CPFH expenditures of F-16C are then analyzed, exploring 
different forecasting options to determine which option best fits each data series. After 
the best forecasting option is selected, the forecast figures are analyzed by comparing 
them with the actual expenditures for FY04. The results of this comparison are then 
analyzed by comparing them to the results of the actual expenditures versus budgeted 
values. The last section presents several results of implementation of the R-TOC program 
in the case of the F-16 Fighting Falcon.  
A. AFTOC DATABASE 
Each service keeps records of operation and support costs – spending on 
Operation and Maintenance (O&M) plus spending on military personnel. As mentioned 
in Chapter IV, the Navy (1974) was the first service to implement a database for 
presenting all O&S cost information for weapon systems, called the Visibility and 
Management of Operating and Support Costs (VAMOSC). However, Logistic 
Management Institute (LMI) study concluded in 1995 that “no service was capturing 
actual cost by weapon system.”111 After this study, the Army and Air Force created their 
own systems for reporting O&S cost information. The Army’s version of the VAMOSC 
is the Operating and Support Management Information System (OSMIS). The Air Force 
named their system the Air Force Total Ownership Costs (AFTOC) database. 
                                                 
111 Jerry Schmidt and Ellis Hitt, “Air Force Total Ownership Costs and Reduction in Total Ownership Costs – Twin 
Pillars of the Air Force Affordability Initiatives,” IEEE (1999), SS.2-1, http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/iel5/ 
6600/17621/00863675.pdf?arnumber=863675 (accessed April 13, 2006). 
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The purpose of these databases is to provide visibility of O&S costs for use in 
cost analysis of Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) and force structure 
alternatives in support of the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) 
process, and satisfy the congressional requirement that DoD capture and report O&S cost 
for MDAPs.112 These databases make possible the management of O&S costs; the LCC 
of a weapon system can therefore be controlled and reduced. 
The AFTOC database is compiled from hundreds of other databases that collect 
cost data as well as data on operations (hours flown) or equipment in inventory. For 
instance, it contains actual expenditures from the Command On-line Accounting & 
Reporting System (COARS), and flying hour data and aircraft inventory data is extracted 
from the Reliability and Maintainability Information System (REMIS). 
B. O&S COSTS ANALYSIS 
As noted in Chapter IV, the AFTOC database contains the necessary data for the 
empirical O&S cost breakout analysis. AFTOC includes all costs associated with the 
USAF total obligation authority, including costs associated with personnel, infrastructure, 
operation and maintenance (O&M), research, development, test and evaluation, and 
acquisition of new systems.  
Schmidt and Hitt illustrate the link between AFTOC and R-TOC analyzing the 
O&S costs of the F-16 weapon system.113 To a large extent, our analysis draws upon 
their paper.  
Table 2 and Figure 22 show the FY04 total costs and FY04 O&M costs of the F-
16C/D weapon system. The data were obtained by adding up the costs for F-16C and F-
16D found in AFTOC. More than half are O&M costs. The second largest expenditure 
category is Military Personnel. 
 
                                                 
112 Department of Defense, “DoDR 5000.4-M – Cost Analysis Guidance and Procedures,” (Washington DC: 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program Analysis and Evaluation, May 2002), 53, 
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf2/p50004m.pdf (accessed April 14, 2006). 
113 Schmidt and Hitt, “AFTOC and R-TOC,” SS.2-4. 
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Figure 22.   FY04 Obligations: F-16C/D. 
 
Figure 23 shows the FY04 O&M cost of the F-16C/D weapon system. The total 
costs are USD 2,378 million. Note that the major cost driver of O&M costs is Depot 
Level Reparables (DLRs). They constitute USD 885,800,885, or 38 percent of the 
expenditures. Therefore these costs are principally targeted for cost reduction. 
                                                 























Figure 23.   F-16C/D FY04 O&M Costs. 
 
Table 3.   F-16C/D FY04 O&M Costs. 
F-16C/D FY04
Civilian Personnel $449,632,870 
DLRs $885,800,885 
Consumables $197,946,097 
AV Fuel $242,967,000 
Depot Maintenance $236,283,078 
Sustaining Engineering $27,738,383 
Software Engineering $26,820,104 
Contract Services $116,709,154 
Other O&M $193,954,249 
Total $2,377,851,820 
 
After an empirical study, a GAO report concluded that about 25 parts, especially 
parts associated with engines and electronic subsystems dominate the maintenance and 
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repair costs of an aircraft.115 The report gives the example of F-16, which in the fiscal 
year reported showed that 25 most fault-prone parts accounted for about 44 percent of the 
system’s total repair part cost, from a possible field of approximately 7,000 repairable 
parts. 
Figure 24 illustrates the F-16C/D high cost of the top DLRs. In the FY04, the top 
twenty-five DLRs cost 37 percent (USD 325.7 million) of the total of all the DLRs. Each 
of these DLRs is now being upgraded or studied for future upgrades within the R-TOC 
program. The last section of this chapter will present how the R-TOC program is 










1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25







Figure 24.   F-16C/D DLR Cost Curve. 
 
The distribution of expenditures on the top twenty-five DLRs is presented in 
Figure 25. The engines are clearly the high cost drivers for the aircraft. The APG-68 
radar system is also an especially expensive item that can be modernized to reduce O&S 
costs. 
                                                 













Figure 25.   F-16C/D Top Twenty-Five DLR Cost Drivers. 
 
1. Level 1 CAIG Data - Empirical O&S Breakout 
Another data format available from AFTOC is the Level 1 CAIG Data, used for 
our empirical O&S breakout. The Level 1 CAIG Data (FY04, F-16C/D) is presented in 
Table 4. In this case, the data for FY 2005 were available; however, the FY04 data are 
presented to offer a complete image of cost for one year. There are seven 1st level cost 
elements, which each of these being a summation of lower levels (2nd and, in some cases 
3rd) of indenture.  
Table 4.   FY04, F-16C/D Level 1 CAIG Data. 
CAIG CAIG Description Total 
1.0 Mission Personnel $1,743,230,041 
2.0 Unit-Level Consumption $1,501,968,295 
3.0 Intermediate Maintenance $313,000 
4.0 Depot Maintenance (not DLRs) $215,992,330 
5.0 Contractor Support $43,313,391 
6.0 Sustaining Support $ 88,012,063 
7.0 Indirect Support $ 472,177,913 
Total Total Expenditures $ 4,065,007,033 
 Note: in Then-Year Dollars. 
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A graphic depiction of Table 4 is presented in Figure 26. As can be observed, the 
major cost drivers are Mission Personnel and Unit-Level Consumption. These two 
elements determined at the operating unit level are the major cost drivers for total cost, 























Figure 26.   FY04, F-16C/D Level 1 CAIG Data. 
 
The Level 1 CAIG data is also used in a trend analysis. The F-16 weapon system 
is evaluated from FY98- FY04. The costs incurred by both models, F-16C and F-16D are 
presented. Line charts are created showing the percentage that each of the seven CAIG 
O&S cost categories contributes to the entire cost for each fiscal year. The percentage 
that each of the seven categories contributes to O&S costs provides a means to compare 
the costs from year to year without the outside influence of inflation, because increases 
due to inflation will apply to all of the categories.  
From FY96 through FY04, the largest portions of overall cost consistently came 
from costs associated with mission personnel and unit-level consumption. These two 
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categories constitute 80 percent of total cost in each year. One can observe a decline of 
these cost percentages between FY98 to FY02 for mission personnel and between FY99 
to FY05 for unit-level consumption. However, these costs were not lower than in 
previous years: very much the contrary. With the exception of FY03 (when the unit-level 
consumption costs were lower than in the previous year), costs increased. These 
decreases are attributable to the dramatic rise of costs associated with contractor support 
(almost doubled in FY02) and depot maintenance. The causes of these increases are 
probably related to upgrades installed in 1999 and 2000, such as Active Flutter 
Suppression System and electric brakes (e-brakes), as well as modifications within the 

































Figure 27.   F-16 C/D O&S Costs. 
 
 
                                                 
116 See Lockheed Martin, “Latest Lockheed Martin F-16 Upgrade Version Completed on Schedule,” 
http://www.lockheedmartin.com/wms/findPage.do?dsp=fec&ci=12553&rsbci=1&fti=133&ti=0&sc=400 (accessed 
April 13, 2006).   
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As can be observed, during recent years, the unit-level consumption costs 
percentage stabilized at around 37 percent. Three of the 3rd level cost elements in this 
category are the factors estimated within the Cost per Flying Hour (CPFH) Program.  The 
next section discusses the CPFH, a subset of the O&S portion of the budget.  
2. Cost per Flying Hour (CPFH) 
CPFH drives a large fraction of O&S and directly addresses actual aircraft 
operation and maintenance costs. The USAF uses the CPFH metric to estimate budget 
needs. CPHF factors allocate dollars against flying hours included in Air Force’s 
program. This program encompasses the number of hours needed to attain and maintain 
combat readiness for aircrews, to test the weapon system and tactics, and to fulfill 
collateral requirements such as air shows and ferrying aircraft.117   
There is no standard understanding of the CPFH concept. An Air Force weapon 
system cost analyst defines CPFH as “a metric used to estimate the costs of fuel, 
consumables, and DLRs necessary to operate a particular weapon system (aircraft) for a 
one hour period.”118  
a. CPFH Recorded in AFTOC 
In the AFTOC database, however, the CPFH are calculated by dividing 
the O&S costs by the flying hours. (O&S costs are the sum of mission personnel and 
O&M costs) Figure 28 displays actual and budgeted Cost per Flying Hour for F-16C/D, 
as extracted from the AFTOC.  
One useful set of steps to calculate annual budget costs for an active duty 
unit is mentioned by Edwards in his thesis.119 
• (Primary Authorized Aircraft per Sqdn) x (Crew Seat Ratio) = Allowed 
Crews per Squadron  
• (Allowed Crews) x (Aircrew Manning Factors) = Budgeted Crews per 
Squadron 
                                                 
117 GAO, “Air Force Operating and Support Costs Reductions Need Higher Priority,” 1. 
118 Pat A. Rose, “Cost Per Flying Hour Factors: A background and Perspective of How They Are Developed and 
What They Do,” Air Force Comptroller 31, no. 3 (July 1, 1997), 4. 
119 Michael V. Edwards, “Flight Hour Costing at the Type Commander and Navy Staff Levels: An Analytical 
Assessment,” (master thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 1992), 17-18. 
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• (Budgeted Crews) x (Req. Hrs/Crew/Month) x (12 mos.) = Annual Flying 
Hours Required per Sqdn  
• (Ann. Flying Hrs Req. per Sqdn) x (Number of Sqdns) = Total Annual 
Flying Hours Required 
• (Total Ann. Flying Hrs Req.) x (Primary Mission Readiness percentage) = 
Annual Budgeted Flying Hours 
• (Ann. Budgeted Flying Hours) x (CPFH) = Annual Budgeted Cost, Active 














Figure 28.   Actual/Budgeted Cost Per Flying Hour: F-16C/D. 
 
Because the Flying Hour Program is an important part of the budget 
proposal, forecasting CPFH has become a critical task for cost analysts. An underestimate 
would lead to an additional funding, typically taken from modernization programs.120  
 
 
                                                 
120 GAO, “Air Force Operating and Support Costs Reductions Need Higher Priority,” 3. 
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b. Forecasting CPFH 
Theoretical approaches to CPFH suggest that there are three main 
forecasting models: time-series, causal and physics-based. The first model will be applied 
using AFTOC data. The other two models are discussed briefly. 
As suggested by a study related to analysis and forecasting of operation 
and support costs for rotary aircraft, there are three different time-series forecasting 
techniques to evaluate CPFH: Three-Year Moving Average (MA3), the Single 
Exponential Smoothing (SES) method, and Holt’s method (Exponential Smoothing with 
trend). Holt’s method outperformed the other two methods primarily because it considers 
trends. Both the Mean Absolute Error (MAE) and the Mean Absolute Percentage Error 
(MAPE) were twice as good as the MAE and MAPE for the other two forecasts.121  
The second model (causal) used in another study (Hawkes), employs 
simple and multiple regressions. To forecast the CPFH for the F-16C/D the author 
identifies nine possible explanatory variables. The most important appear to be the 
following: aircraft age, OPTEMPO, utilization rate, and base location. Hawkes performs 
a one-way analysis of variance for all explanatory variables in order to determine which 
of them are statistically significant. Based on the above, the author builds six models, 
three for active duty wings and three for Air National Guard (ANG).122  




The model relates the CPFH of active duty fighter wings to four 
explanatory variables: utilization rate (numbers of hours flown divided by the number of 
aircraft), percent block 50 (a variable which quantify the proportion of F-16C/D block 
50), and two variables which describe the location the wing is assigned to.123 
                                                 
121 Mathew E Laubather, “Analysis and Forecasting of Air Force Operating and Support Costs for Rotary Aircraft” 
(master thesis, Air Force Institute of Technology, 2004), 62-67. 
122 Eric M. Hawkes, “Predicting the Cost per Flying Hour for the F-16 Using Programmatic and Operational 
Variables,” (Master’s Thesis, Air Force Institute of Technology, 2005), 46-79. 
123 Ibid., 49. 
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The third model (physics-based) used other parameters besides hours to 
predict consumption costs. It was developed by the Logistics Management Institute 
(LMI) as an alternative to CPFH, and is relevant during contingencies.124 The analysis of 
LMI experts demonstrates that during contingency operations the number of flying hours 
increases dramatically, but the consumption of parts does not.  
The model was verified using the F-16C fighters deployed at Aviano Air 
Base (Italy). Initially, the model considered four critical factors: ground cycles or ground 
days (ground hours divided by 24), flying hours, warm take-off/landing cycle (warm 
cycles), and cold take-off/landing cycle. The last parameter was subsequently eliminated. 
The total F-16C fleet model predicts 20.1 percent ground-induced removals, 6.4 percent 
warm cycle-induced removals, and 73.4 percent flying hour-induced removals.125  
c. Time-Series Forecasting Methods of CPFH 
Time-series forecasting methods are applied to F-16C/D data extracted 
from AFTOC. Appendix J describes in detail these three forecasting techniques. In 
addition, the evaluation measures (Mean Error [ME], Mean Absolute Error [MAE], Mean 
Percentage Error [MPE] and Mean Absolute Percentage Error [MAPE]) are also 
presented. Appendix K displays the entire data set used for employing the time-series 
forecasting methods. The Solver function within Excel was used to find the optimal value 
of coefficients used for SES and Holt’s forecast. Tables 5 and 6 below show the 
evaluation measures that were calculated for F-16C and F-16D.  
 
Table 5.   F-16C Evaluation Measures (Nominal Data). 
F-16C MA SES Holt 
ME 1,520.03 811.49 180.13 
MAE 1,520.03 841.59 574.96 
MPE 13.46% 7.79% 1.92% 
MAPE 13.46% 8.08% 5.68% 
 
 
                                                 
124 John M. Wallace, Scout A. Houser and David A. Lee, “A Physics-Based Alternative to Modeling Aircraft 
Consumption Costs” (report, Logistics Management Institute, McLean, Virginia, August 2000), 
http://www.dodcas.osd.mil/ DoDCAS2003%20presentations/Advanced/Lee.pdf (accessed May 12, 2006). 
125 Wallace, Houser and Lee, “A Physics-Based Alternative to Modeling Aircraft Consumption Costs,” 4-21. 
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Table 6.   F-16D Evaluation Measures (Nominal Data). 
F-16D MA SES Holt 
ME 1,662.70 764.80 73.97 
MAE 1,662.70 764.80 490.20 
MPE 16.00% 8.11% 1.24% 
MAPE 16.00% 8.11% 5.50% 
 
Of the three forecasting techniques evaluated, Holt’s method definitely 
achieves the lowest errors. The explanation for this fact is that Holt’s method, unlike the 
other two techniques employed, can exploit trends within the data. The graphs in Figure 7 
illustrate a positive trend of CPFH experienced by the USAF in the case of the F-16C/D. 
Consequently, Holt’s method proved to be an appropriate technique to forecast CPFH. 
Another advantage of Holt’s method is that it can forecast more than one 
period ahead if needed. However, this method has a few negative aspects. One is that it 
can take a long time to overcome the influence of a one-period shift in the opposite 
direction of the overall trend. The shift in an opposite direction is evident in the case of 
the F-16C for the year 2002. The data observed was USD 10484.21, USD 90.30 lower 
than the previous year. Therefore, for 2002 the percentage error given by the variation 
between the observed value and the forecasted value was 11.3 percent. However, for 
FY04 the CPFH forecasted for the F-16C with Holt’s method is the exact value recorded 
in AFTOC.  
Another important observation regarding the evaluation measures is that 
none of the ME or MPE is negative. This indicates that the forecasted values are, on 
average, lower than observed values. Therefore, one disadvantage of these forecasting 
methods is the risk of underfunding.  
A source of the positive trend observed is inflation. To eliminate this 
factor, actual data from AFTOC are adjusted to 2005 dollars. In Figure 29 the observed 
data (in FY05 dollars) are graphed and the budgeted values for FY05 and forecast values 

















Figure 29.   Actual/Budgeted and Forecasted Cost Per Flying Hour: F-16C/D (in 2005 
dollars). 
 
The inflation conversion factors have been extracted from the Conversion 
Factor Table offered by Oregon State University.126 They are shown below in Table 7. 
 











                                                 
126 Robert Sahr, Inflation Conversion Factors for Dollars 1665 to Estimated 2016, Oregon State University, 
http://oregonstate.edu/Dept/pol_sci/fac/sahr/sahr.htm (accessed June 3, 2006). 
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Adjusting the observed values to correct for inflation does not change the 
overall results obtained, but the forecast results are improved. Tables 8 and 9 below show 
the evaluation measures that were calculated for the F-16C and F-16D after adjustment 
for inflation. 
 
Table 8.   F-16C Evaluation Measures (Adjusted Data for Inflation). 
F-16C MA SES Holt
ME 1,132.90 630.76 137.24 
MAE 1,132.90 722.51 529.27 
MPE 9.35% 5.52% 1.28% 
MAPE 9.35% 6.33% 4.72% 
 
Table 9.   F-16D Evaluation Measures (Adjusted Data for Inflation). 
F-16D MA SES Holt
ME 1,339.03 604.47 27.50
MAE 1,339.03 612.94 566.76
MPE 12.01% 5.82% 0.52%
MAPE 12.01% 5.91% 5.63%
 
The majority of the evaluation measures are lower and the smallest 
margins for error are obtained using Holt’s method. Once more the forecast value for 
2004 for the F-16C is identical with adjusted observed data using Holt’s method. In 
addition, the MAPEs obtained are lower, even though the slope of the positive trend was 
reduced by applying the inflation conversion factors. 
The first section of this chapter identified the main cost drivers in the case 
of the F-16C/D and the second section showed how CPFH, a significant determinant of 
O&S costs, can be forecasted. The last part of this chapter exemplifies how F-16 O&S 
costs are reduced within the R-TOC program. 
C. R-TOC PRACTICES FOR F-16 PROGRAM 
As mentioned in Chapter IV, the R-TOC program is the DoD-wide effort to 
reduce Total Ownership Cost of fielded weapon systems. The F-16 weapon system was 
selected along with other 29 programs. The aging of the F-16 fleet has increased O&S 
costs, endangering operational ability and readiness of the most popular aircraft in the 
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USAF inventory. The F-16 System Program Office (SPO) has sought to introduce R-
TOC practices throughout the F-16 community. To achieve this objective, a Cost 
Reduction Integrated Product Team (CRIPT) was established to identify O&S cost 
drivers. For the international F-16 community (including Poland), one of the SPO’s 
objectives is to explore possible international cooperation to support TOC reduction 
efforts. The F-16 SPO has also implemented two R-TOC initiatives: a system of Service-
Level Agreements and Government Performance Reports for improving supply support 
and the Combined Life-Time Support Program.127  
The F-16 R-TOC program is one of the best examples of R-TOC practices as a 
process of continuous development. However, F-16 R-TOC efforts are complex and 
difficult because the inventory of F-16s consists of more than 4,000 units worldwide in 
variety of versions. Additionally, because of continuing international sales, the F-16 is 
unique in the sense that many of the opportunities for TOC reduction initiatives come 
about as a result of international sales opportunities.128 
R-TOC practices for the F-16 program consist of following elements: R-TOC 
Management, Reliability and Maintainability (R&M) Improvement Initiatives, Supply 
Chain Response Times/Footprint Reduction, and Combined Life Time Support (CLTS). 
In R-TOC Management, reduction of TOC for the F-16 was not expected to meet 
20 percent savings for FY2005. However, even the forecast 3.6 percent for the FY 2005 
was a significant amount of money saved.129 Results of R-TOC implementation showed 
that R-TOC savings practices are worth doing: “The program office’s persistence has 
resulted in development approval and funding of new R-TOC initiatives. In August 2000, 
projected FY05 savings totaled only USD 20.1 Million; this estimate has grown to USD 
65.5 Million, and life cycle savings exceed USD 1.5 Billion.”130 
                                                 
127 DoD Reduction of Total Ownership Costs official Web site, “Pilots Programs to Reduce Total Ownership Costs 
(R-TOC) – F-16 Fighting Program,” http://ve.ida.org/rtoc/open/pilots/f16.html (accessed May 12, 2006). 
128 Department of Defense, “Reduction of Total Ownership Costs (R-TOC) Best Practices Guide” (Washington 
D.C.: Office of Defense Systems, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, September 
2003), 10, http://www.dmsms.org/file.jsp?storename=OSD_version.doc (accessed May 12, 2006). 
129 DoD, “Reduction of Total Ownership Costs (R-TOC)  Best Practices Guide,” 10. 
130 Ibid., 10. 
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R&M Improvements Initiatives for the F-16 encountered the following problems: 
diminishing manufacturing capacity, aging fleet issues, and decreasing reliability. The 
Program Manager (PM) and Supply Chain Manager (SCM) developed the Falcon Flex 
program. The main objective was reduction of O&S costs and improvement of reliability. 
Falcon Flex has 17 initiatives. The principal focus is to identify cost drivers in order to 
proactively forecast solutions among them. After cost driver identification, costs are 
ranked, causes are also identified, and solutions are formulated.  
Results of the Falcon Flex program are also impressive. Two initiatives for 
redesigns of two of the top three O&S cost drivers of the APG-68 radar system 
programmable single processor (PSP) were considered. The PSP memory card 
replacement project replaced a USD 14,000 component which had a 500 hour MTBF and 
a USD 3,000 repair cost with a USD 6,000 throw-away component with a 40,000 hour 
MTBF. Similarly, the power supply replacement for the same unit replaced a USD 
70,000 component with a 500 hour MTBF and USD 6,000 repair cost with USD 8,000 
throw-away unit with 10,000 hour MTBF.131 
The Supply Chain Response Times/Footprint Reduction initiative was meant to 
improve fill rates and reduce cycle times for the F-16 maintenance line and landing gear 
shop at Ogden Air Logistics Center (OO-ALC). As a result of the ongoing initiative, 
Total Ownership Costs have declined due to improved fill rates for low cost consumable 
bench stock items such as fasteners, gaskets, seals, o-rings, etc. Also, cycle times have 
been reduced and government owned inventory for bench stock items were reduced or 
eliminated.132 
Combined Life Time Support (CLTS) is a program which takes a new approach 
to system sustainment. The contractor is held responsible for Diminishing Manufacturing 
Sources (DMS) management and determines timing and approach to DMS prevention 
and resolution. This proactive solution to DMS problems is carried out before DMS 
                                                 
131 DoD, “Reduction of Total Ownership Costs (R-TOC)  Best Practices Guide,” 21. 
132 DoD, “Reduction of Total Ownership Costs (R-TOC)  Best Practices Guide,” 22. 
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impacts sustainment. Material management responsibilities are shared by government and 
contractor equally. Shared responsibility motivates contractors to improve reliability.  
The CLTS practices have brought benefits for the government and contractors as 
well. Government keeps the core of workload while reducing TOC: contractors partner 
with government. Contractors have an opportunity to promote design changes as well as 
having support of their product lines.133  
The R-TOC initiatives implemented in the F-16 program has brought 
improvement in TOC reduction and readiness. They allow sustaining readiness of an 
aging weapon system such as the F-16 with reduction of logistic footprint. However, the 
Polish and Romanian cases indicate that age of the aircraft will not be a factor (Poland 
purchased new planes and Romania is considering that option), because new user of the 
F-16 weapon system may need to implement best practices of the R-TOC program in the 
near future. Additionally, R-TOC initiatives may be implemented in the early phases of 
weapon system development.    
                                                 
133 DoD, “Reduction of Total Ownership Costs (R-TOC)  Best Practices Guide,” 32. 
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VI.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Total Life Cycle System Management (TLCSM) could be an affective tool to 
identify, track, and manage the Total Ownership Cost, if implemented properly. The 
difficulties in implementation come from the complexity, multidimensionality, and 
different avenues of approach.  Also, the TLCSM concept is not yet mature in Poland and 
Romania. However, TLCSM should be a main priority when acquiring new weapon 
systems such as the F-16. Therefore, concepts such as TLCSM and TOC/LCC should 
become standard practices because they constitute a foundation for the effective 
management of complex weapon systems. Moreover, these concepts have been 
demonstrated in practice by the U.S. DoD.    
Costs after initial investment are significant and require serious consideration. 
O&S costs represent the majority of the TOC for USAF weapon systems. That fact is 
widely recognized, and in recent years the focus has shifted from reducing acquisition 
costs to reducing total ownership costs. The analysis included in this report confirmed 
that the F-16 C/D is not an exception. For instance, the O&S costs of the F-16C/D were 
87 percent of total costs in 2004 (35 percent Military Personnel, 52 percent Operating and 
Maintenance).  
The analysis also identified DLRs as the main cost drivers of O&M. They must be 
addressed when considering reduction of TOC in general, with careful attention to the top 
25 DLR items, which include components of engines (F100-PW and F110-GE), APG-68 
radar and avionics.  Management of these cost drivers will be particularly difficult since 
the PoAF and RoAF fly a relatively small number of aircraft. As suggested by Professor 
Engelbeck, this would create unique spares for the PoAF and RoAF.134 The search for 
appropriate solutions among alternatives such as establishing a Reliability Centered 
Maintenance (RCM) or consolidation of DLR maintenance capabilities within the 
European Union F-16 users may constitute a topic for further study. 
                                                 
134 While the RoAF has not yet selected its multi-role combat aircraft, the recommendations made here for F-16 
would apply to any such aircraft. 
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Holt’s model (exponential smoothing with trend) applied in this study using 1998-
2004 AFTOC data provided a useful method for forecasting CPFH. In another study 
(Laubacher) Holt’s model proved to be valuable in predicting the CPFH of rotary aircraft 
as well. Therefore, this model can be viewed as an effective decision-making tool to 
obtain realistic estimates of CPFH, and consequently of O&S costs. However, because 
the forecast values are, on average, lower than observed values this method should be 
used with caution in budgeting O&S costs to avoid underfunding.  
The chief recommendation of this study is that the Polish and Romanian Air 
Forces should establish databases to record O&S costs. The compilation of several data 
bases into one integrated database is an essential step for efficient forecasting and 
managing TOC in general and O&S costs in particular. Efforts to reduce O&S costs of 
multi-role aircraft in the PoAF and RoAF should be preceded by establishment of a 
reliable and consistent O&S cost database. Moreover, as an F-16 user, Poland should take 
advantage of U.S. and other user countries’ experience with this fighter aircraft to obtain 
access to common digitized data.135 Romania should include acquiring of the cost 
database of its future multi-role fighter aircraft in the acquisition process.   
Simultaneous with the acquisition process, the PoAF and RoAF should adopt the 
best practices of managing and reducing TOC. Furthermore, they should become actively 
engaged in exploring new possible R-TOC initiatives.  
                                                 
135 This new database is mentioned in a report of the Air Force Logistics Management Agency. Timothy Smith, 
“USAF Condition-Based Maintenance Plus (CBM+) Initiative” (Maxwell-Gunter AFB Montgomery, AL: Air Force 
Logistics Management Agency, September 2003), 35. 
http://www.acq.osd.mil/log/logistics_materiel_readiness/organizations/mppr/assetts/cbm+/Air_Force/AFLMA%20CB
M%20final%20Sep%2003.pdf (accessed June 7, 2006). 
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APPENDIX A.  OFFSET MULTIPLIERS FOR DIRECT OFFSET 
COMMITMENTS IN THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND136  
 
Subject of the commitment  Multipliers
1. Capital and tangible equity investments: 0.7 – 1.9 
1) purchase of stock or shares from the State Treasury, 1.1 – 1.6 
2) cash contribution to the share capital of a company, 1.1 – 1.9 
3) in-kind contribution to the share capital of a company. 0.7 – 1.3 
2. Intangible investments: 0.9 – 2.0 
1) transfer of a technology and know-how connected with the production of: 1.2 – 2.0 
a) rifles and ammunition, 1.7 – 2.0 
b) armored and mechanized weapon, 1.2 – 1.5 
c) aviation equipment, 1.8 – 2.0 
d) electronic and optoelectronic equipment, 1.9 – 2.0 
e) vessels, 1.4 – 1.8 
f) logistical security equipment. 1.2 – 1.4 
2) transfer of a license connected with production of: 0.9 – 1.7 
a) rifles and ammunition, 1.5 – 1.7 
b) armored and mechanized weapon, 0.9 – 1.3 
c) aviation equipment, 1.5 – 1.7 
d) electronic and optoelectronic equipment, 1.6 – 1.7 
e) vessels, 1.1 – 1.3 
f) logistical security equipment. 0.9 – 1.1 
3) participation in the program of modernization of delivery’s subjects 
(purchased armament or military equipment). 
1.5 – 2.0 
3. Direct purchase of goods and services manufactured on the territory of 
Republic of Poland: 
0.5 – 2.0 
1) connected with the subject of delivery of the armament or military 
equipment, 
1.0 – 2.0 
2) although not connected with the subject of delivery of the armament or 
military equipment, but 
0.5 – 2.0 
a) connected with production of rifles and ammunition, 1.6 – 2.0 
b) connected with production of armored and mechanized weapon, 1.5 – 1.9 
c) connected with production of aviation equipment, 1.7 – 2.0 
d) connected with production of electronic and optoelectronic equipment, 1.8 – 2.0 
                                                 
136 Republic of Poland. Ministry of Economy, “Ordinance of the Counsel of Ministers of 2 July 2002 concerning 
the detailed principles for crediting offset commitments of a foreign supplier of armament or military equipment 
against the offset agreement value,” http://www.mgip.gov.pl/NR/rdonlyres/44734642-D9A7-4BFB-
82F1FB48A5443547/12516/offset_mult_ordin_eng.pdf (accessed April 29, 2006). 
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Subject of the commitment  Multipliers
e) connected with production of vessels, 1.1 – 1.7 
f) connected with production of logistical security equipment. 0.5 – 1.3 
4. Development of the research, development and implementation potential 
(R+D+I): 
1.0 – 2.0 
1) offsettee’s participation in an international: 1.0 – 2.0 
a) aviation program, 1.8 – 2.0 
b) other program. 1.0 – 1.7 
2) foreign supplier’s capital participation in offsettee’s R+D works, 1.0 – 2.0 
3) implementation of Polish development (e.g. establishment of the Venture 
Capital 
1.0 – 2.0 
5. Support of export of goods manufactured on the territory of Republic of 
Poland including: 
0.5 – 1.5 
1) sales of goods manufactured on the territory of Republic of Poland 
through an own marketing network, 
0.5 – 1.5 
2) marketing and promotion support for the export of the Polish goods in 
third markets, 
0.5 – 1.2 
3) other actions not specified in items 1 and 2. 0.5 – 1.2 
6. Training: 0.5 – 1.1 
1) connected with the transfer of technology or know-how, 0.7 – 1.1 
2) connected with purchased armament or military equipment, 0.9 – 1.1 
3) other. 0.5 – 0.9 
7. Other fields not specified in items 1 through 6. 0.5 – 2.0 
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APPENDIX B.  OFFSET MULTIPLIERS FOR INDIRECT OFFSET 
COMMITMENTS IN THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND137  
 
Subject of the commitment  Multipliers
1. Capital and tangible equity investments: 0.7 – 1.9 
1) purchase of stock or shares from the State Treasury, 1.1 – 1.6 
2) cash contribution to the share capital of a company, 1.4 – 1.9 
3) in-kind contribution to the share capital of a company. 0.7 – 1.3 
2. Intangible investments: 0.9 – 2.0 
1) transfer of modern technology and know-how in: 0.9 – 2.0 
a) metallurgic, iron, and steel industry, 1.5 – 1.8 
b) electro-machinery industry, 1.4 – 1.7 
c) automotive industry, 1.2 – 1.5 
d) chemical industry, 1.9 – 2.0 
e) rail-train industry, 0.9 – 1.2 
f) pharmaceutical industry, 1.9 – 2.0 
g) light industry, 0.9 – 1.1 
h) electronic industry, 1.5 – 2.0 
i) shipyard industry, 1.5 – 2.0 
j) IT field, 1.9 – 2.0 
k) other sectors, 0.9 – 1.1 
2) transfer of modern licenses in: 0.9 – 1.7 
a) metallurgic, iron and steel industry, 1.4 – 1.7 
b) electro-machinery industry, 1.2 – 1.5 
c) electronic industry, 1.2 – 1.5 
d) automotive industry, 1.1 – 1.3 
e) shipyard industry, 1.1 – 1.3 
f) chemical industry, 1.5 – 1.7 
g) rail trains industry, 0.9 – 1.1 
h) pharmaceutical industry, 1.4 – 1.7 
i) light industry, 0.9 – 1.1 
j) IT field, 1.5 – 1.7 
k) other sectors, 0.9 – 1.1 
3) direct purchase of goods and services manufactured on the territory of 
Republic of Poland in: 
0.5 – 1.8 
                                                 
137 Republic of Poland, Ministry of Economy, “Ordinance of the Counsel of Ministers of 2 July 2002 concerning 
the detailed principles for crediting offset commitments of a foreign supplier of armament or military equipment 
against the offset agreement value,” http://www.mgip.gov.pl/NR/rdonlyres/44734642-D9A7-4BFB-
82F1FB48A5443547/12516/offset_mult_ordin_eng.pdf (accessed April 29, 2006). 
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Subject of the commitment  Multipliers
a) metallurgic, iron and steel industry, 1.5 – 1.8 
b) electro-machinery industry, 1.6 – 1.8 
c) electronic industry, 1.6 – 1.8 
d) automotive industry, 1.2 – 1.4 
e) shipyard industry, 1.2 – 1.4 
f) chemical industry, 1.2 – 1.4 
g) rail-train industry, 1.1 – 1.3 
h) pharmaceutical industry, 1.3 – 1.6 
i) light industry, 0.9 – 1.1 
j) IT field, 1.5 – 1.8 
k) other sectors. 0.5 – 1.1 
3. Development of R+D+I potential: 1.0 – 2.0 
1) offsettee’s participation in an international program, 1.0 – 2.0 
2) foreign supplier’s capital participation in offsettee’s R+D works, 1.0 – 2.0 
3) implementation of the Polish development (e.g. establishment of the 
Venture 
1.0 – 2.0 
4. Support of export of goods manufactured on the territory of Republic of 
Poland: 
0.5 – 1.5 
1) sales of goods manufactured on the territory of Republic of Poland 
through an own 
0.5 – 1.5 
marketing network, 0.5 – 1.2 
2) marketing and promotion support for the export of the Polish goods in 
third 
0.5 – 1.2 
5. Training: 0.5 – 1.1 
1) connected with the transfer of technology or know-how, 0.7 – 1.1 
2) other. 0.5 – 0.9 
6. Other fields not specified in items 1 through 5. 0.5 – 2.0 
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APPENDIX C.  OFFSET MULTIPLIERS USED IN CASES 
SPECIALLY JUSTIFIED BY THE ECONOMY OR DUE TO THE 
SECURITY AND DEFENSE OF THE STATE IN THE REPUBLIC OF 
POLAND138  
Cases in which offset multipliers ranging from 2.0 to 5.0 may be applied Multipliers
1. Transfer of modern technology, substantiated by prospective orders, which 
will result, within the implementation of the same offset agreement, in 
initiation of production basing on that technology. 
3 – 5 
2. Participation in modernization and restructuring of defense industry sector 
through capital equity investments, which will result in significant increase 
of export production and number of work places. 
2 - 4 
3. Transfer of technology with exclusivity for prospective production and 
sales on foreign market. 
2 – 5 
4. Free-of-charge and non-returnable transfer to a budgetary entity, for which 
the armament or military equipment was bought and delivery of which was 
subject to offset, of equipment for operation of that armament or military 
equipment and its technical documentation, enabling usage in accordance 
with the purpose of the purchased armament or military equipment and its 
maintenance in technical operation. 
2 – 4 
5. Transfer to the research and development entity or Polish higher education 
entity, of software or other modern IT tool which will support that entity’s 
operation within the scope of design, production, or marketing. 
2 – 3 
6. Commissioning to a research and development entity or Polish higher 
education entity, within a joint R+D+I program, of package of works leading 
to rapid development of science sectors weakly recognized in Poland, which 
will result in significant increase research and production potential. 
2 – 5 
7. Commissioning to a research entity, within a joint R+D+I program, 
guarantee the undertaking of production Polish entrepreneurs. 
2 – 4 
 
                                                 
138 Republic of Poland, Ministry of Economy, “Ordinance of the Counsel of Ministers of 2 July 2002 concerning 
the detailed principles for crediting offset commitments of a foreign supplier of armament or military equipment 
against the offset agreement value,” http://www.mgip.gov.pl/NR/rdonlyres/44734642-D9A7-4BFB-
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APPENDIX D.  OFFSET COMMITMENTS LIST INCLUDED IN 
MASTER OFFSET AGREEMENT139 
No ID no Offset commitment Offsetor Offsetee 
1 1-100 Creation of the professional 
nation mobile communication 
system according to the Tetra 
standard. 




2 1-105 Support for the FAA certification 
and export to South and North 
America of the M-28 and M-18 
aircraft. Upgrade of this aircraft 
models. Cooperation with PZM 
Mielec for assembly other types 





Lotnicze Sp. z o.o., 
Mielec 
3 1-107 Transfer of technology for 
manufacturing wind power 
stations and the rights to sell them 
to the European Union’s market. 
Winvid, Belgium CNPEP Radwar 
S.A., Warszawa  
PZL-Świdnik S.A., 
Świdnik 
4 1-110 Capital contribution to the 






East Hartford, Ct. 
U.S. 
WSK PZL-
Rzeszów S.A. , 
Rzeszów 
5 1-112 Creation of the Materiel Analysis 










6 1-114 Purchase of aircraft parts from 






East Hartford, Ct. 
U.S. 
Polskie Zakłady 
Lotnicze Sp. z o.o., 
Mielec 
7 1-115 Accommodation of the 
Wojskowe Zakłady Lotnicze 





Lotnicze Nr 4, 
Warszawa 
                                                 
139 Republic of Poland, Ministry of Economy, “List of Offset Commitments Included in the Master Offset 
Agreement,”http://www.mgip.gov.pl/NR/rdonlyres/565CC648-937F-4F03-99B2-
C256C67BD475/0/lista_zobowiazan.doc (accessed April 29, 2006). 
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No ID no Offset commitment Offsetor Offsetee 
to the tests of F-100-PW-229 
engines.  
Pratt&Whitney, 
East Hartford, Ct. 
U.S. 
8 1-132 Purchase of aircraft components 





9 1-133 Purchase of aircraft components 
from Polskie Zakłady Lotnicze 




Lotnicze Sp. z o.o. 
10 1-134 Purchase of helicopters 






11 1-137 Purchase of aircraft components 
from Kombinat PZL-Hydral S.A. 
Textron Lycoming Kombinat PZL-




Modernization, repair and 
maintenance of the American 




Lotnicze Nr 2, 
Bydgoszcz 
13 1-145-1 Purchase components of 
superchargers and power 





Rzeszów S.A. , 
Rzeszów 
14 1-145-2 Purchase components of 
superchargers and power 






15 1-2-126 Purchase metal products from 
HSW S.A. 
Omniquip Textron  Huta Stalowa Wola 
S.A., Stalowa Wola






Huta Stalowa Wola 
S.A., Stalowa Wola
17 2-100 Export support system for polish 
small and middle businesses to 
the U.S. 











18 2-102 Modernization of the Gdańsk 
Refinery 
Kellogg, Shell, 
DSD, Uhde, JGC 
Rafineria Gdańska 
S.A., Gdańsk 
19 2-103 Technology  Accelerator  University of 
Texas-Austin, 
Austin, Texas, U.S. 
Uniwersytet 
Łódzki, Łódź, 
Fundacja F.I.R.E. - 
Warszawa 
20 2-104 Creation of a crisis coordination LM Mission Computerland S.A., 
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No ID no Offset commitment Offsetor Offsetee 
system. Systems Prokom S.A. 
21 2-106 Creation and implementation of 





22 2-1-109 Purchase RO-RO ships from 






Sp. z o.o., Szczecin
23 2-1-113 Modernization and export of 





East Hartford, Ct. 
U.S. 
PW Kalisz Sp. z 
o.o. , Kalisz 
24 2-1-129 Purchase aircraft components 
from Goodrich Krosno S.A. 
Goodrich Goodrich Krosno 
S.A. , Krosno 
25 2-1-135 Purchase of services from 




S.A. , Krosno 
26 2-1-136 Purchase of services from WSK 
Gorzyce S.A. 
Textron (Lycoming) WSK Gorzyce 
S.A., Gorzyce 
27 2-1-138 Purchase parts form Zakład 
Obróbki Plastycznej Świdnik Sp. 
z o.o. 
Textron (Lycoming) Zakład Obróbki 
Plastycznej 
Świdnik Sp. z o.o., 
Świdnik 
28 2-116 Start-up production at Opel 
Polska Sp. z o.o. of a new model 
car T-3000 Astra and the 
production of spare parts. 
Lockheed Martin 
Aeronautics Co. 
Opel Polska Sp. z 
o.o., Gliwice 
29 2-120-1 Capital investments in production 
and purchase of machine 
components. 
Caterpillar World 
Trading; 76 route de 
Frontenex; CH-
1211 Geneva 6, 
Switzerland 
Caterpillar Poland 
Sp. z o.o., Janów 
Lubelski 
30 2-120-2 Purchase components from 
Fabryka Aparatury i Urządzeń 
FAMET S.A. w Kędzierzyn 
Koźle 
Caterpillar World 
Trading; 76 route de 
Frontenex; CH-
1211 Geneva 6, 
Switzerland 




31 2-120-3 Purchase components from 
Fabryka  Maszyn Sp. z o.o. 
Caterpillar World 
Trading; 76 route de 
Frontenex; CH-
1211 Geneva 6, 
Switzerland 
Fabryka Maszyn 
Sp. z o.o., Janów 
Lubelski 
32 2-124 Purchase automotive components 
from Pezetel-Melex Sp. z o.o. 
Textron Golf & 
Turf Care 
Pezetel-Melex Sp. z 
o.o., Mielec 
33 2-125 Purchase components from Alpha Greenlee Textron  Alpha Sp. z o.o., 
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No ID no Offset commitment Offsetor Offsetee 
Sp. z o.o. Kraków 
34 2-128 Capital investment and purchase 
electronic car components from 






Polska Sp. z o.o., 
Poznań 
35 2-131 Building of a simulators and 
training systems by ETC-PZL 
Environmental 
Tectonics Corp. 
ETC-PZL Sp. z 
o.o., Warszawa 









ETC-PZL Sp. z 
o.o., Warszawa 
37 2-134-1 Purchase aircraft components 
from Wytwórnia Aparatury 
Wtryskowej Mielec Sp. z o.o. 
Royston 




Sp. z o.o., Mielec 
38 2-134-2 Purchase supercharger 
components from 
Przedsiębiorstwo Automatyki 







39 2-134-3 Purchase supercharger 
components from Kuźni Glinik 
Sp. z o.o. 
Royston 
Components Ltd 
Kuźnia Glinik Sp. z 
o.o., Gorlice 
40 2-134-4 Purchase automotive components 
from Teksid Aluminium Poland 




Poland Sp. z o.o., 
Bielsko-Biała 
41 2-134-5 Purchase automotive components 
from Andoria-MOT Sp. z o.o. 
Royston 
Components Ltd 
Andoria-MOT Sp. z 
o.o., Andrychów 
42 2-134-6 Purchase machine components 




43 2-137 Investment to restructuring of the 
Polish pharmaceutical industry 







Sp. z o.o., Ożarów 
Mazowiecki 
44 2-138 Production and export of blue 
laser 






















































5 740 1510 12 
Financial/materiel 
contribution 




Other 1 25 50 0.7 








10 537 1268 10,1 
Financial/materiel 
contribution 




Other 4 808 965 7.7     










                                                 
140 Republic of Poland, Ministry of Economy, “The Juxtaposition of Lockheed Martin’s Offset Commitments,” 
http://www.mgip.gov.pl/NR/rdonlyres/D388B4F0-F028-4D79-A15F-B5EFD29BDC8F/0/zestawienie_zbiorcze.doc 
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APPENDIX F.  LIST OF OFFSET AGREEMENTS IN POLAND AS 
OF 1 MARCH 2006141 
 





connected with the 
delivery of C295M 
transport aircrafts for 
the Polish Air Force 
28th of August 
2001 
212.04 million $ 
2 GEIE Eurotorp, 
France 
connected with the 
delivery of light 








connected with the 
delivery of systems for 
ORKAN class ships for 




4 Lockheed Martin 
Corporation, U.S. 
connected with the 
delivery of F-16 
fighters for the Polish 
Air Force 
18th of April 
2003 
6.028 billion $ 
5 Patria Vehicles 
Oy, Finland 
connected with the 
delivery of Armored 
Wheeled Vehicles 
(AMV) for the Polish 
Army 
1st of July 2003 482 million € 
6 Oto Melara S.p.A, 
Italy 
connected with the 
delivery of Armored 
Wheeled Vehicles 
(AMV) for the Polish 
Army 
1st of July 2003 308 million € 




connected with the 
delivery of Anti-Tank 
Guided Missiles for the 
Polish Army 
17th of February 
2004 
440 million $ 
 
 
                                                 
141 Republic of Poland, Ministry of Economy and Labor “List of offset agreements in Poland as of 1 January 2005,”  
http://www.mgip.gov.pl/NR/rdonlyres/44734642-D9A7-4BFB-82F1-
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APPENDIX G.  AOA PLAN142 
The first major step for successful AoA plan is construction and coordination 










• Constraints and Assumptions 
• Alternatives 
• Description of Alternatives 
• Nonviable Alternatives 
• Operation Concepts 
• Support Concepts 
• Determination of Effectiveness Measures 
• Mission Task 
• Measures of Effectiveness 
• Measures of Performance 
• Effectiveness Analysis 
• Effectiveness Methodology 
• Model, Simulations and Data 
• Effectiveness Sensitivity Analysis  
• Cost Analysis 
• Lifecycle Cost Methodology 
                                                 
142 DAU, “Defense Acquisition Guidebook,” para. 3.3.1. 
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• Models and Data 
• Cost Sensitivity or/and Risk Analysis 
• Cost Effectiveness Comparison 
• Cost Effectiveness Methodology 
• Displays or Presentation Formats   
• Criteria for Screening Alternatives 
• Organization and Management 
• Study Team/Organization 
• AoA Review Process 
• Schedule 
It must be pointed that every AoA is unique and may be adjusted to the 
particular situation. The proposal of AoA plan above may be used as a framework to 
tailor AoA to support given situation.  
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APPENDIX H.  SUPPORTABILITY ANALYSIS143  
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APPENDIX I.  AIRCRAFT OPERATING AND SUPPORT COST 
ELEMENT STRUCTURE144 
1.0 MISSION PERSONNEL 
 1.1 OPERATIONS 
 1.2  MAINTENANCE 
 1.3 OTHER MISSION PERSONNEL 
 
2.0 UNIT-LEVEL CONSUMPTION 
 2.1 POL/ENERGY CONSUMPTION 
 2.2 CONSUMABLE MATERIAL/REPAIR PARTS 
 2.3 DEPOT-LEVEL REPARABLES  
 2.4 TRAINING MUNITIONS/EXPENDABLE STORES 
 2.5 OTHER 
 
3.0 INTERMEDIATE MAINTENANCE (EXTERNAL TO UNIT) 
 3.1 MAINTENANCE 
 3.2  CONSUMABLE MATERIAL/REPAIR PARTS 
 3.3 OTHER 
 
4.0 DEPOT MAINTENANCE 
 4.1 OVERHAUL/REWORK  
 4.2  OTHER 
 
5.0 CONTRACTOR SUPPORT 
 5.1 INTERIM CONTRACTOR SUPPORT 
 5.2 CONTRACTOR LOGISTICS SUPPORT 
 5.3 OTHER 
 
6.0 SUSTAINING SUPPORT 
 6.1 SUPPORT EQUIPMENT REPLACEMENT 
 6.2 MODIFICATION KIT PROCUREMENT/INSTALLATION 
 6.3 OTHER RECURRING INVESTMENT 
 6.4 SUSTAINING ENGINEERING SUPPORT 
 6.5 SOFTWARE MAINTENANCE SUPPORT 
 6.6 SIMULATOR OPERATIONS 
 6.7 OTHER 
 
7.0 INDIRECT SUPPORT 
 7.1 PERSONNEL SUPPORT 
 7.2 INSTALLATION SUPPORT 
                                                 
144 From: OSD, “Operating and Support Cost-Estimating Guide,” Appendix C. 
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AIRCRAFT OPERATING AND SUPPORT 
COST ELEMENT STRUCTURE DEFINITIONS 
 
1.0  MISSION PERSONNEL 
 
 The mission personnel element includes the cost of pay and allowances of officer, 
enlisted, and civilian personnel required to operate, maintain, and support a discrete 
operational system or deployable unit.  This includes the personnel necessary to meet 
combat readiness, unit training, and administrative requirements.  For units that operate 
more than one type of aircraft system, personnel requirements will be allocated on a relative 
workload basis.  The personnel costs will be based on manning levels and skill categories. 
 
 Note: Pay and allowances for officer and enlisted personnel should be based on the 
standard composite rate, which includes the following elements:  basic pay, retired 
pay accrual, incentive pay, special pay, basic allowance for quarters, variable 
housing allowance, basic allowance for subsistence, hazardous duty pay, 
reenlistment bonuses, clothing allowances, overseas station allowances, uniform 
allowances, family separation allowances, separation payments, and social security 
contributions. 
 
 Pay and allowances for civilian personnel should be based on the standard 
composite rate, which includes the following elements:  basic pay, additional 
variable payments for overtime, holiday pay, night differentials, cost-of-living 
allowances, and the government contribution to employee benefits, insurance, 
retirement, and the Federal Insurance Contribution Act. 
 
1.1  OPERATIONS.  The pay and allowances for the full complement of aircrew personnel 
required to operate a system.  Aircrew composition includes the officers and enlisted 
personnel (pilot, non-pilot, and crew technicians) required to operate the aircraft of a 
deployable unit.   
 
1.2  MAINTENANCE.  The pay and allowances of military and civilian personnel who 
perform maintenance on and provide ordnance support to assigned aircraft, associated 
support equipment, and unit-level training devices.  Depending on the maintenance concept 
and organizational structure, this element will include maintenance personnel at the 
organizational level and possibly the intermediate level145.  A brief description of these 
maintenance categories is shown below: 
 
• Organizational Maintenance.  Personnel who perform on-equipment 
maintenance for unit aircraft. 
• Intermediate Maintenance.  Personnel who perform off-equipment 
                                                 
145 For example, in a typical deployable Air Force unit, intermediate-level maintenance personnel are normally 
assigned to the same wing as the organizational maintenance personnel.  Depending upon the weapon system, the other 
DoD components may integrate required intermediate-level maintenance personnel into a composite deployable unit 
according to the number of systems to be deployed. 
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maintenance for unit aircraft.  If intermediate-level maintenance is 
provided by a separate support organization (e.g., a centralized 
intermediate maintenance support activity) the costs should be reported 
in element 3.0, Intermediate Maintenance (External to Unit). 
• Ordnance Maintenance.  Personnel performing maintenance and service 
functions for aircraft munitions, missiles, and related systems.  Also 
includes personnel needed for loading, unloading, arming, and rearming 
of unit munitions; inspecting, testing, and maintaining of aircraft 
weapons and release systems; activation and deactivation of aircraft gun 
systems; and maintenance and handling of the munitions stockpile 
authorized by the war reserve material plan. 
• Other Maintenance Personnel.  Personnel not covered above.  Includes 
those personnel that support equipment maintenance, simulator 
maintenance, and Chief of Maintenance functions related to the system 
whose costs are being estimated. 
1.3  OTHER MISSION PERSONNEL.  The pay and allowances of military and civilian 
personnel, who perform unit staff, security, and other mission support activities. The number 
and type of personnel in this category will vary depending on the requirements of the 
particular system.  These billets exist only to support the system whose costs are being 
estimated.  Some examples are:  
 
• Unit Staff.  Personnel required for unit command, administration, flying 
supervision, operations control, planning, scheduling, flight safety, 
aircrew quality control, etc. 
• Security.  Personnel required for system security.  Duties may include 
entry control, close and distant boundary support, and security alert 
operations. 
• Other Support.  Personnel required for staff information, logistics, 
ground safety, fuel and munitions handling, and simulator operations as 
well as for special mission support functions such as intelligence, photo 
interpretation, etc. 
2.0  UNIT-LEVEL CONSUMPTION 
 
 Unit-level consumption includes the cost of fuel and energy resources; operations, 
maintenance, and support materials consumed at the unit level; stock fund reimbursements 
for depot-level reparables; operational munitions expended in training; transportation in 
support of deployed unit training; temporary additional duty/temporary duty (TAD/TDY) 
pay; and other unit-level consumption costs, such as purchased services for equipment 
leases and service contracts. 
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2.1  POL/ENERGY CONSUMPTION.  The unit-level cost of petroleum, oil, and 
lubricants (POL), propulsion fuel, and fuel additives required for peacetime flight 
operations.  Includes in-flight and ground consumption, and an allowance for POL 
distribution, storage, evaporation, and spillage.  May also include field-generated electricity 
and commercial electricity if necessary to support the operation of the system.  
 
2.2  CONSUMABLE MATERIAL/REPAIR PARTS.  The costs of material consumed in 
the operation, maintenance, and support of an aircraft system and associated support 
equipment at the unit level.  Depending on the maintenance concept or organizational 
structure, consumption at the intermediate level should be reported either in this element or 
in element 3.0, Intermediate Maintenance (External to Unit).  Costs need not be identified at 
the level of detail shown below; the descriptions are intended merely to illustrate the various 
types of materials encompassed in this element: 
 
• Maintenance Material.  The cost of material expended during 
maintenance.  Examples include consumables and repair parts such as 
transistors, capacitors, gaskets, fuses, and other bit-and-piece material. 
• Operational Material.  The cost of non-maintenance material consumed 
in operating a system and support equipment.  Examples include 
coolants, deicing fluids, tires, filters, batteries, paper, diskettes, ribbons, 
charts, and maps. 
• Mission Support Supplies.  The cost of supplies and equipment expended 
in support of mission personnel.  Examples include items relating to 
administration, housekeeping, health, and safety. 
2.3  DEPOT-LEVEL REPARABLES.  The unit-level cost of reimbursing the stock fund 
for purchases of depot-level reparable (DLR) spares (also referred to as exchangeables) used 
to replace initial stocks.  DLRs may include repairable individual parts, assemblies, or 
subassemblies that are required on a recurring basis for the repair of major end items of 
equipment.   
 
 Note:  Defense Management Report Decisions (DMRDs) 901 and 904 of November 
1989 proposed the establishment of a Defense Business Operations Fund (DBOF) 
under which DLRs would be consolidated under stock fund management.  The cost 
of DLRs, previously a free issue to the consumer, must now be funded and budgeted 
by the resource user.  A surcharge is added to the price of DBOF items to recover 
the cost of stock fund operations. 
 
2.4  TRAINING MUNITIONS/EXPENDABLE STORES.  The cost of expendable 
stores consumed in unit-level training.  Includes the cost of live and inert ammunition, 
bombs, rockets, training missiles, sonobuoys, and pyrotechnics expended in noncombat 
operations (such as firepower demonstrations) and training exercises. 
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2.5  OTHER.  Include in this element any significant unit-level consumption costs not 
otherwise accounted for.  The costs identified must be related to the system whose operating 
and support requirements are being assessed.  Possible examples are: 
 
• Purchased Services.  The cost of special support equipment, 
communication circuits, and vehicles, including service contracts for 
custodial services, computers, and administrative equipment. 
• Transportation.  The deployed unit transportation cost of moving primary 
mission and support equipment, repair parts, secondary items, POL, and 
ammunition to and from training areas.  May also include transportation 
costs for items procured or shipped by the unit.  Excluded are 
transportation costs for reparables acquired through DBOF. 
• TAD/TDY.  Temporary additional duty or temporary duty (TAD/ TDY) 
pay.  The cost of unit personnel travel for training, administrative, or 
other purposes such as crew rotations, deployments, or follow-on tests 
and evaluation.  Includes commercial transportation charges, rental costs 
for passenger vehicles, mileage allowances, and subsistence expenses 
(e.g., per diem allowances and incidental travel expenses). 
 
3.0  INTERMEDIATE MAINTENANCE (EXTERNAL TO UNIT) 
 
 Intermediate maintenance performed external to a unit includes the cost of labor and 
material and other costs expended by designated activities/units (third and fourth echelon) in 
support of an aircraft system and associated support equipment.  Intermediate maintenance 
activities include calibration, repair, and replacement of parts, components, or assemblies, 
and technical assistance. 
 
3.1  MAINTENANCE.  The pay and allowances of military and civilian personnel who 
perform intermediate maintenance on an aircraft system, associated support equipment, and 
unit-level training devices. 
 
3.2  CONSUMABLE MATERIAL/REPAIR PARTS.  The costs of repair parts, 
assemblies, subassemblies, and material consumed in the maintenance and repair of aircraft, 
associated support equipment, and unit-level training devices.   
 
3.3  OTHER.  Include in this element any significant intermediate maintenance costs not 
otherwise accounted for.  For example, this could include the cost of transporting 
subsystems or major end items to a base or depot facility. 
 
4.0  DEPOT MAINTENANCE 
 
 Depot maintenance includes the cost of labor, material, and overhead incurred in 
performing major overhauls or maintenance on aircraft, their components, and associated 
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support equipment at centralized repair depots, contractor repair facilities, or on site by 
depot teams.  Some depot maintenance activities occur at intervals ranging from several 
months to several years.  As a result, the most useful method of portraying these costs is on 
an annual basis (e.g., cost per aircraft system per year) or an operating-hour basis.  
 
 Note:  The cost of depot-level reparables (DLRs) or exchangeables acquired through 
DBOF should be reported in element 2.0, Unit-Level Consumption. 
 
4.1  OVERHAUL/REWORK.  The labor, material, and overhead costs for overhaul or 
rework of aircraft returned to a centralized depot facility.  Includes programmed depot 
maintenance, analytic condition inspections, and unscheduled depot maintenance.  Costs of 
major aircraft subsystems that have different overhaul cycles (i.e., airframe, engine, 
avionics, armament, support equipment) should be identified separately within this element. 
 
4.2  OTHER.  Include in this element any significant depot maintenance activities not 
otherwise accounted for.  For example, this could include component repair costs for 
reparables not managed by the DBOF, second-destination transportation costs for weapons 
systems or subsystems requiring major overhaul or rework, or contracted unit-level support. 
 
 Note:  Not all reparable items are acquired through DBOF.  Centrally funded 
accounts may continue to finance items such as classified program DLRs, 
conventional and nuclear munitions items, and certain cryptologic electronics and 
telecommunication items. 
  
5.0  CONTRACTOR SUPPORT 
 
 Contractor support includes the cost of contractor labor, materials, and overhead 
incurred in providing all or part of the logistics support required by an aircraft system, 
subsystem, or associated support equipment.  Contract maintenance is performed by 
commercial organizations using contractor personnel, material, equipment, and facilities or 
government-furnished material, equipment, and facilities.  Contractor support may be 
dedicated to one or multiple levels of maintenance and may take the form of interim 
contractor support (ICS) if the services are provided on a temporary basis or contractor 
logistics support (CLS) if the support extends over the operational life of a system.  Other 
contractor support may be purchased for engineering and technical services. 
 
5.1  INTERIM CONTRACTOR SUPPORT.  Interim contractor support (ICS) includes 
the burdened cost of contract labor, material, and assets used in providing temporary 
logistics support to a weapon system, subsystem, and associated support equipment.  The 
purpose of ICS is to provide total or partial logistics support until a government maintenance 
capability is developed. 
5.2  CONTRACTOR LOGISTICS SUPPORT.  Contractor logistics support (CLS) 
includes the burdened cost of contract labor, material, and assets used in providing support 
to an aircraft system, subsystem, and associated support equipment.  CLS funding covers 
depot maintenance and, as negotiated with the operating command, necessary organizational 
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and intermediate maintenance activities.  If CLS is selected as the primary means of support, 
all functional areas included in the CLS cost should be identified. 
 
5.3  OTHER.  Include in this element any contractor support costs not otherwise accounted 
for.  For example, if significant, the burdened cost of contract labor for contractor 
engineering and technical services should be reported here.   
 
 Note:  Contractor support during the pre-operational phase of a system is typically 
funded as a system development or investment cost.  However, post-operational 
contractor support is an O&S cost and should be addressed in this element. 
 
 After the ICS period, the government assumes responsibility for supporting a 
weapon system.  However, contractor support may still be employed in specific 
functional areas, such as sustaining engineering, software maintenance, simulator 
operations, and selected depot maintenance functions.  Applicable contractor costs 
should be reported against these elements in the CES.  To avoid double counting, the 
contractor support element should be annotated to identify any contractor costs that 
are reported in other elements. 
 
6.0  SUSTAINING SUPPORT 
 
 Sustaining support includes the cost of replacement support equipment, modification 
kits, sustaining engineering, software maintenance support, and simulator operations 
provided for an aircraft system.  War readiness material is specifically excluded. 
 
6.1  SUPPORT EQUIPMENT REPLACEMENT.  The costs incurred to replace 
equipment that is needed to operate or support an aircraft, aircraft subsystems, training 
systems, and other associated support equipment.  The support equipment being replaced 
(e.g., tools and test sets) may be unique to the aircraft or it may be common to a number of 
aircraft systems, in which case the costs must be allocated among the respective systems.  
 
 Note:  This element addresses replacement equipment only.  The costs of initial 
support equipment are specifically excluded. 
 
6.2 MODIFICATION KIT PROCUREMENT/INSTALLATION.  The costs of 
procuring and installing modification kits and modification kit initial spares (after 
production and deployment) required for an aircraft and associated support and training 
equipment.  Includes only those modification kits needed to achieve acceptable safety levels, 
overcome mission capability deficiencies, improve reliability, or reduce maintenance costs.  
Excludes modifications undertaken to provide additional operational capability not called 
for in the original design or performance specifications. 
 
6.3  OTHER RECURRING INVESTMENT.  Include in this element any significant 
recurring investment costs not otherwise accounted for.  
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6.4  SUSTAINING ENGINEERING SUPPORT.  The labor, material, and overhead costs 
incurred in providing continued systems engineering and program management oversight to 
determine the integrity of a system, to maintain operational reliability, to approve design 
changes, and to ensure system conformance with established specifications and standards.  
Costs in this category may include (but are not limited to) government and/or contract 
engineering services, technical advice, and training for component or system installation, 
operation, maintenance, and support. 
 
6.5  SOFTWARE MAINTENANCE SUPPORT.  The labor, material, and overhead costs 
incurred after deployment by depot-level maintenance activities, government software 
centers, laboratories, or contractors for supporting the update, maintenance and 
modification, integration, and configuration management of software.  Includes operational, 
maintenance, and diagnostic software programs for the primary system, support equipment, 
and training equipment.  The respective costs of operating and maintaining the associated 
computer and peripheral equipment in the software maintenance activity should also be 
included.  Not included are the costs of major redesigns, new development of large 
interfacing software, and modifications that change functionality. 
 
6.6  SIMULATOR OPERATIONS.  The costs incurred to provide, operate, and maintain 
on-site or centralized simulator training devices for an aircraft system, subsystem, or related 
equipment.  This may include the labor, material, and overhead costs of simulator operations 
by military and/or civilian personnel, or by private contractors.  
 
 Note:  On-site simulator operations and maintenance that are an integral part of unit 
manning and unit consumption should be reported as unit-level mission costs for the 
system in question.  However, the costs of all contract-funded simulator operations 
and all centralized government simulator operations should be reported in this 
element.  
 
6.7  OTHER.  Include in this element any significant sustaining support costs not otherwise 
accounted for.  Examples might include the costs of follow-on operational tests and 
evaluation, such as range costs, test support, data reduction, and test reporting. 
 
7.0  INDIRECT SUPPORT 
 
 Indirect support includes the costs of personnel support for specialty training, 
permanent changes of station, and medical care.  Indirect support also includes the costs of 
relevant host installation services, such as base operating support and real property 
maintenance. 
 
7.1  PERSONNEL SUPPORT.  Personnel support includes the cost of system-specific and 
related specialty training for military personnel who are replacing individuals lost through 
attrition.  Also included in this element are permanent change of station costs, and the cost 
of medical care.  Each of these elements should be addressed separately.  Descriptions are 
provided below: 
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• Specialty Training. The cost of system-specific training (non-investment 
funded) and specialty training for military personnel who are replacing 
individuals lost through attrition. For example, specialty training costs 
may include undergraduate pilot training, non-pilot aircrew training, 
non-aircrew officer training, and enlisted specialty training. Replacement 
specialty training costs should be calculated for those personnel 
associated with the system being investigated. Training costs should 
include government non-pay-related training costs (course support costs, 
materials, per diem, travel, etc.) as well as the cost of pay and allowances 
for trainees, instructors, and training support personnel. Excluded are 
recruiting, accession, basic military training, and separation costs. 
 Note: The cost of initial course development and training of Service instructors at 
contractor facilities is normally categorized as a system investment cost.  However, 
the follow-on training costs of military and civilian personnel attending factory 
schools, as well as the cost of attending Service conducted school-house specialty 
training, are O&S costs and should be reported in this element. 
 
 Normally, the costs of acquisition for recruiting, accession, and basic military 
training will not be included.  However, if a significant change in Service recruiting 
and training objectives is required in order to support the system being assessed, 
then these costs should be addressed. 
 
• Permanent Change of Station (PCS).  The cost of moving replacement 
personnel to and from overseas theaters and within the continental US. 
• Medical Support.  The cost of personnel pay and allowances and material 
needed to provide medical support to system-specific mission and related 
military support personnel. 
7.2. INSTALLATION SUPPORT. Consists of personnel normally assigned to the host 
installation who are required for the unit to perform its mission in peacetime.  Include only 
those personnel and costs that are directly affected by a change in the number of aircraft and 
associated mission personnel.  Functions performed by installation support personnel 
include: 
 
• Base Operating Support. The cost of personnel pay and allowances and 
material necessary to provide support to system-specific mission- related 
personnel.  Base operating support activities may include functions such 
as communications, supply operations, personnel services, installation 
security, base transportation, etc. 
• Real Property Maintenance. The cost of personnel pay and allowances, 
material, and utilities needed for the maintenance and operation of 
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APPENDIX J.  TIME-SERIES FORECASTING TECHNIQUES AND 
MEASURES OF ERROR146 
A. TIME-SERIES FORECASTING TECHNIQUES  
1. The Three-Year Moving Average (MA3)  
The MA3 uses the average of the past three observations to forecast for the 
current period. The number of data points in each average remains constant and includes 
the most recent observations. 









1     (1) 
Where 1+tF  is the current forecast, iY  is the ith observation, and t is the sequence 
order number of the observation before the current forecast. The reason the order of the 
MA is three and not a higher order, such as five, which could possibly result in better 
forecasting, is due to the fact that the data series are small and having a larger order 
would greatly restrict the number of figures forecasted. Applying the method of moving 
averages to a set of data containing a trend gives forecasts that continually underestimate 
the actual values. (The same problem of lagging behind actual values exists when 
randomness is present).147 
2. Single Exponential Smoothing (SES) 
The SES method uses the following formula to forecast for the next period: 
( )tttt FYFF −+=+ αα1    (2) 
where, tF  is the most recent forecast, 1+tF  is the current forecast, tY  is the most recent 
observation, and alpha is a weight value between 0 and 1. The level of alpha dictates how 
much the previous forecast error is weighted, the weight of the previous error increases as 
                                                 
146 Adapted from Spyros Makridakis and Steven C. Wheelwright, Forecasting: Methods and Applications, (New 
York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1978) and Jeffrey M. Moore and Larry R. Weatherford, Decision Modeling within 
Microsoft® Excel, 6th ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2001). 
147 Ibid., 55. 
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alpha increases and becomes closer to 1. This method is valuable because as each new 
forecast uses the error of the previous forecast it ends up using a weighted scheme that 
uses decreasing weights as the observations get older. The downfall of this forecasting 
method is the same as the MA3 in that it doesn’t handle trends very well and it will trail 
any trend in the actual data. 
3. Holt’s Method148 
The simple exponential smoothing models don’t perform very well on models that 
have obvious up or down trend in the data. To correct this, Holt developed the following 
model: 
( )( )111 −− +−+= tttt bLYL αα    (3) 
( ) ( ) 11 1 −− −+−= tttt bLLb ββ    (4) 
mbLF ttmt +=+     (6) 
where tL Lt is an estimate of the level of the series at time t and tb  is an estimate 
of the slope of the series at time t, alpha and beta are smoothing constraints between 0 
and 1, tY  is the most recent observation, 1−tL  is the last smoothed value, 1−tb  is trend of 
the previous period, and m is the number of periods ahead to be forecasted. 
B. MEASURES OF ERROR 
Three measures of error are: 
 










(ii) The mean absolute error 









(iii) The mean square error 









                                                 
148 Makridakis and Wheelwright call this method Holt’s Two-Parameter Linear Exponential Smoothing. 
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The mean error is not very useful. It tends to be near zero as positive and negative 
errors tend to cancel. It is only of use in detecting systematic under or over forecasting. 
The mean square error is a squared quantity so be careful and do not directly 
compare it with the MAE. Its square root is usually similar to the MAE. 
The relative or percentage error is defined as 








The mean percentage error is 









and the mean absolute percentage error is 
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APPENDIX K.  RESULTS OF FORECASTING METHODS 
A. THREE YEAR MOVING AVERAGE (NOMINAL DOLLARS)  
Year F-16C MA Error Abs Error % Error Abs % Error 
1998 $ 7,649.80      
1999 $ 8,569.10      
2000 $ 9,475.27      
2001 $ 10,574.51 $ 8564.72 2,009.78 2,009.78 19.01% 19.01% 
2002  $ 10,484.21 $ 9539.62 944.58 944.58 9.01% 9.01% 
2003  $ 11,706.86  $ 10177.99 1,528.87 1,528.87 13.06% 13.06% 
2004  $ 12,518.75  $ 10921.86 1,596.90 1,596.90 12.76% 12.76% 
2005  $ 13,146.61  $ 11569.94 1,576.67 1,576.67 11.99% 11.99% 
       
Year F-16D MA Error Abs Error % Error Abs % Error 
1998 $ 6,842.45      
1999 $ 7,837.12      
2000 $ 8,081.13      
2001 $ 9,280.20 $ 7586.90 1,693.30 1,693.30 18.25% 18.25% 
2002 $ 10,176.31 $ 8399.48 1,776.82 1,776.82 17.46% 17.46% 
2003 $ 11,121.22 $ 9179.21 1,942.00 1,942.00 17.46% 17.46% 
2004 $ 11,431.25 $ 10192.58 1,238.67 1,238.67 10.84% 10.84% 
2005 $ 13,277.08 $ 10909.59 2,367.49 2,367.49 17.83% 17.83% 
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B. SES METHOD F-16C/D (NOMINAL DOLLARS) 
Year F-16C SES Error Abs Error % Error Abs % Error 
1998 $ 7,649.80 #N/A     
1999 8,569.10 $ 7,649.80 919.29 919.29 10.73% 10.73% 
2000 9,475.27 8,293.31 1,181.96 1,181.96 12.47% 12.47% 
2001 10,574.51 9,120.68 1,453.83 1,453.83 13.75% 13.75% 
2002 10,484.21 10,138.36 345.85 345.85 3.30% 3.30% 
2003 11,706.86 10,380.45 1,326.41 1,326.41 11.33% 11.33% 
2004 12,518.75 11,308.94 1,209.81 1,209.81 9.66% 9.66% 
2005 13,146.61 12,155.81 990.80 990.80 7.54% 7.54% 
       
Year F-16D SES Error Abs Error % Error Abs % Error 
1998 $ 6,842.45 #N/A     
1999 7,837.12 $ 6,842.45 994.66 994.66 12.69% 12.69% 
2000 8,081.13 7,538.72 542.42 542.42 6.71% 6.71% 
2001 9,280.20 7,918.41 1,361.79 1,361.79 14.67% 14.67% 
2002 10,176.31 8,871.66 1,304.64 1,304.64 12.82% 12.82% 
2003 11,121.22 9,784.91 1,336.30 1,336.30 12.02% 12.02% 
2004 11,431.25 10,720.33 710.92 710.92 6.22% 6.22% 
2005 13,277.08 11,217.97 2,059.11 2,059.11 15.51% 15.51% 
 
 
alpha = 0.89         
            
Year CPFH/F-16C Fcst EPS Abs. Error Abs. % Error   
1998 7,649.80  NA   NA   
1999 8,569.10  $     7,649.80  919.29 10.7%   
2000 9,475.27  $     8,569.10  906.17 9.6%   
2001 10,574.51  $     9,475.27  1099.24 10.4%   
2002 10,484.21  $   10,574.51  90.30 0.9%   
2003 11,706.86  $   10,484.21  1222.66 10.4%   
2004 12,518.75  $   11,706.86  811.89 6.5%   
     $   12,518.75   $       841.59      
        8.1% = MAPE 
      
alpha = 0.91         
            
Year CPFH/F-16D Fcst EPS Abs. Error Abs. % Error   
1998 6,842.45  NA   NA   
1999 7,837.12  $     6,842.45  994.66 12.7%   
2000 8,081.13  $     7,837.12  244.02 3.0%   
2001 9,280.20  $     8,081.13  1199.07 12.9%   
2002 10,176.31  $     9,280.20  896.11 8.8%   
2003 11,121.22  $   10,176.31  944.91 8.5%   
2004 11,431.25  $   11,121.22  310.03 2.7%   
     $   11,431.25   $       764.80      
        8.1% = MAPE 
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C. HOLT’S METHOD F-16C/D (NOMINAL DOLLARS) 
Year F-16C Holt Error Abs Error % Error Abs % Error 
1998 $ 7,649.80      
1999 8,569.10  $     7,649.80 919.29 919.29 10.73% 10.73% 
2000 9,475.27  $     9,249.41 225.86 225.86 2.38% 2.38% 
2001 10,574.51  $   10,442.21 132.29 132.29 1.25% 1.25% 
2002 10,484.21  $   11,668.71 -1,184.50 1,184.50 -11.30% 11.30% 
2003 11,706.86  $   10,719.03 987.83 987.83 8.44% 8.44% 
2004 12,518.75  $   12,518.75 0.00 0.00 0.00% 0.00% 
2005 13,146.61  $   13,459.05 -312.43 312.43 -2.38% 2.38% 
       
Year F-16D Holt Error Abs Error % Error Abs % Error 
1998 $ 6,842.45      
1999 7,837.12  $     6,842.45 994.66 994.66 12.69% 12.69% 
2000 8,081.13  $     8,573.20 -492.07 492.07 -6.09% 6.09% 
2001 9,280.20  $     8,582.36 697.84 697.84 7.52% 7.52% 
2002 10,176.31  $   10,233.89 -57.59 57.59 -0.57% 0.57% 
2003 11,121.22  $   11,178.09 -56.88 56.88 -0.51% 0.51% 
2004 11,431.25  $   12,073.42 -642.18 642.18 -5.62% 5.62% 
2005 13,277.08  $   11,900.83 1,376.25 1,376.25 10.37% 10.37% 
 
alpha = 0.87             
beta = 1.00             
                
Year CPFH/F-16C Level Term Trend Term Fcst EPS Abs. Error Abs. % Error   
1998  $    7,649.80   $   7,649.80  0  NA   NA   
1999  $    8,569.10   $   8,449.61  799.803  $     7,649.80 919.29 10.7%   
2000  $    9,475.27   $   9,445.91  996.303  $     9,249.41 225.86 2.4%   
2001  $  10,574.51   $  10,557.31  1111.401  $   10,442.21 132.29 1.3%   
2002  $  10,484.21   $  10,638.17  80.861  $   11,668.71 1184.50 11.3%   
2003  $  11,706.86   $  11,578.46  940.291  $   10,719.03 987.83 8.4%   
2004  $  12,518.75   $  12,518.75  940.292  $   12,518.75 0.00 0.0%   
         $   13,459.05  $ 574.96      
            5.7% = MAPE 
alpha = 0.87             
beta = 1.00             
                
Year CPFH/F-16C Level Term Trend Term Fcst EPS Abs. Error Abs. % Error   
1998  $    6,842.45   $   6,842.45  0  NA   NA   
1999  $    7,837.12   $   7,707.83  865.374  $     6,842.45 994.66 12.7%   
2000  $    8,081.13   $   8,145.09  437.268  $     8,573.20 492.07 6.1%   
2001  $    9,280.20   $   9,189.49  1044.400  $     8,582.36 697.84 7.5%   
2002  $  10,176.31   $  10,183.79  994.298  $   10,233.89 57.59 0.6%   
2003  $  11,121.22   $  11,128.61  944.816  $   11,178.09 56.88 0.5%   
2004  $  11,431.25   $  11,514.72  386.111  $   12,073.42 642.18 5.6%   
         $   11,900.83  $ 490.20      
            5.5% = MAPE 
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D. THREE YEAR MOVING AVERAGE (FY05 DOLLARS)  
Year F-16C/$TY F-16C/ $05 MA ($FY05) Error Abs Error % Error Abs % Error 
1998 7,649.80 9,161.44      
1999 8,569.10 10,045.84      
2000 9,475.27 10,742.93      
2001 10,574.51 11,658.77 9,983.40 1,675.37 1,675.37 14.37% 14.37% 
2002 10,484.21 11,383.50 10,815.85 567.66 567.66 4.99% 4.99% 
2003 11,706.86 12,427.67 11,261.74 1,165.93 1,165.93 9.38% 9.38% 
2004 12,518.75 12,945.97 11,823.31 1,122.66 1,122.66 8.67% 8.67% 
2005 13,146.61 13,146.61 12,252.38 894.23 894.23 6.80% 6.80% 
        
Year F-16D/$TY F-16D/ $05 MA ($FY05) Error Abs Error % Error Abs % Error 
1998 6,842.45 8,194.55      
1999 7,837.12 9,187.71      
2000 8,081.13 9,162.28      
2001 9,280.20 10,231.75 8,848.18 1,383.57 1,383.57 13.52% 13.52% 
2002 10,176.31 11,049.19 9,527.25 1,521.95 1,521.95 13.77% 13.77% 
2003 11,121.22 11,805.96 10,147.74 1,658.22 1,658.22 14.05% 14.05% 
2004 11,431.25 11,821.35 11,028.97 792.38 792.38 6.70% 6.70% 
2005 13,277.08 13,277.08 11,558.84 1,718.24 1,718.24 12.94% 12.94% 
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